7 Powerful Forex Risk Management Strategies - My Trading ...

[Guide] Hal-hal esensial yang wajib dimiliki mahasiswa.

Selamat pagi! Salam mahasiswa!
Terinspirasi dari komen-komen di thread gua sebelumnya, gua ingin compile beberapa must-have tools, stuff, and websites untuk kalian yang baru saja jadi mahasiswa atau sedang menjalani studi.
Gue akan memisahkan ke beberapa kategori, yaitu Wajib Punya, Wajib Punya Untuk Anak [Jurusan], Boleh Punya, Cukup Tau, dan Jangan Pernah Sentuh. Dalam kategori tersebut akan diisi dengan kombinasi apps, website, dan alat-alat fisik. Untuk yang bersifat bajakan, sorry to say gua gak akan link di sini, kecuali Sci Hub atau Gen Lib.
Bagi redditor yang bukan anak psikologi, tolong bantuin gua ya dengan comment berisi suggestion kalian.

WAJIB PUNYA

  1. WhatsApp, LINE, dan sometimes Telegram. : Ya menurut lo aja deh, hari gini masih SMS?
  2. Flash drive : Get an 8GB stick, walaupun sekarang udah serba digital, kadang dosen masih minta print-out tugas. Plus, tukang fotokopi pasti sibuk dan gak ada waktu buka e-mail (walaupun ada), akan lebih praktis kalau data yang mau lo print atau submit pindahin dulu ke sini. Side note : Untuk anak DKV, Arsitektur, Desain Produk, Musik, dan Film, sepertinya kalian wajib beli external hard-drive minimal 500GB. Kalau bisa SSD ya, biar file terus protected (tapi agak mahal).
  3. Google Drive dan isinya (Sheets, Docs, Draw, Slides) : Lo akan mobile for most of your campus life, GDrive gunanya bukan hanya sebagai backup tapi sebagai base of operations dari perkuliahan lo. Separate folders into semesters, lalu di dalamnya bikin folder per matkul, dan di dalamnya pun ada folder buku, tugas, class notes, and etc.
  4. Google Calendar : Start planning through this app. Its highly underrated and I suggest you take time and learn how GCal works. Most people only use this after they started working, getting a head start is always better.
  5. Mendeley atau reference manager lain : Lu akan menghabiskan waktu 4 tahun baca artikel ilmiah, kadang mereka suka aneh formatting filenya kalo di-download dan mereka udah pasti gak appealing untuk di-save di laptop. Mendeley cuts off all of the problems and puts all of your references in one place. (Available on desktop and mobile)
  6. Google Scholar : Berhubungan dengan sebelumnya, Google Scholar akan menjadi wikipedia elu di perguruan tinggi. You will access this site almost every day in uni.
  7. Genesis Library : Adalah perpustakaan terlengkap di jagad internet. Gak usah beli textbook kalau lu gak mampu, download aja di sini.
    1. Side points : Perpusnas punya akses e-book gratis pula, mostly koleksi mereka ada di situ. Appnya bisa dicari di Google Play Store (iOS setau gua belom ada).
  8. Sci-hub : This is the scalpel of academia, the tool of a true mahasiswa. Sometimes lo akan ketemu artikel yang BAGUS, tapi sayang lo harus bayar ke publishernya. Nah, this bypasses that and you can have the PDF for FREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE. Add extensionnya https://github.com/allanino/sci-hub-fy
  9. E-book manager like Calibre (for PC and iOS) and Aldiko (for Android) : Pretty self-explanatory karena most of the time mahasiswa tingkat awal itu gak tau cara manage folder di laptop.
  10. m-Banking app from your bank : Sekarang apa-apa sudah serba digital, belom lagi kalau lo butuh bayar-bayar atau patungan sama temen. Dengan adanya mbanking app, lo udah gak butuh ke ATM. Bahkan, sekarang mbanking bisa bayar ke OVO, Gopay, or Shoppee Pay lewat QRIS.
  11. Go-Jek or Grab (and OVO) : Kemana-mana dan bayar apa-apa lebih gampang.
  12. Kartu emoney, Flazz, Brizzi, dan sejenis : Silahkan beli salah satu dari kartu ini untuk kalian yang harus menggunakan moda transportasi seperti KRL atau Transjakarta. Plus, very handy untuk beli air putih di Indo/Alfamart. Kalau bisa yang satu jenis dengan bank kalian, agar top-up dapat dilakukan secara mudah di ATM atau app mbanking (bagi yang memiliki NFC hpnya)
  13. Cheap OEM earphones : You will have some solace from annoying pieces of shit when you're reading or doing assignments. Browse through any ecommerce site and search for "headset samsung/iphone grosir" and buy 10.
  14. Masker : Well, duh.
  15. Zoom/Skype/Hangouts/Microsoft Teams : Please check on your faculty's specification, sekarang lagi pandemi and I don't think you guys are going back to school any soon.
  16. Powerbank : Trust me, you will forget to charge your phone. One powerbank on the ready will be a life saver, especially during late nights.
  17. OpenOffice or LibreOffice : I do not condone the piracy of a certain word processing software. Get open-source and just relax. Alternatively, you can go all-out with Google's existing apps inside Drive.
  18. JASP : I also do not condone the piracy of a certain statistics software.
  19. Canva : Untuk anak-anak non-design yang gak bisa design, ditambah gak punya duit untuk hire designer (ya menurut lo), please take time to learn Canva. I would recommend GIMP a few years ago, but Canva has been gold standard of designing for non-designers.
  20. Sumatra Reader : Lighter and more superior version of Adobe Reader.
  21. 7zip : Lighter and superior version of WinRAR.
  22. CamScanner : For scanning documents. Available on iOS and Android
  23. Condoms : Just, bring it.
  24. Kartu Perpusnas
  25. MSDN : Kadang Microsoft kerjasama dengan kampus, check on your faculty.
  26. Tar tambah lagiiiii.......

WAJIB PUNYA UNTUK ANAK.....

Teknik
  1. Kalkulator scientific : Bisa cari di toko buku atau e-commerce. Get Texas Instrument or Casio.
  2. KOPI SACHET
  3. Meteran
  4. nanti kali ya
Arsitektur
  1. Kopi sachet yang banyak
  2. Kotak P3K
  3. Penggaris segitiga atau meteran
MIPA
  1. Graphic Calculator
Psikologi
  1. APA Publication Manual : Sebagai S.Psi gua akan menekankan PENTINGNYA MEMILIKI PDF INI DI SEMUA DEVICE ELU. Pelajarin dan cross-check semua style tulis dengan editorial style APA. Dosen PASTI BAKAL PERIKSA GAYA TULISAN ELU DENGAN APA.
  2. KBBI : Dosen Psikologi paling terkenal dengan penulisan dan artikulasi kata, tolong pelajari bentuk baku kata-kata bahasa kita.
  3. 3D Brain : Untuk bantu Psiko Abnormal dan Faal.
Hukum
  1. Buku KUHP dan KUHPER, e-book or printed.
  2. Black Law
  3. UU yang berkaitan dengan kelas, e-book or printed.
  4. Printer dengan tinta isi ulang alias nyuntik
CompSci, Teknik Informatika, or Sistem Informatika
  1. Git Student Pack

BOLEH PUNYA

  1. Spotify Premium : Check if your school is eligible for student discount! I do not condone using modified APK for Spotify Premium.
  2. Audacity : Boleh lah punya kalau mau coba-coba bikin podcast.
  3. Da Vinci Resolve : Kalian akan sewaktu-waktu dapet tugas buat edit video, either untuk kelas atau organisasi. Ini software open source yang lumayan powerful untuk editing.
  4. SSDs for laptops : This is me speaking from experience, you'll need this if your risk of being in an accident is high. Upgrading to an SSD is 0-1, not only you get great booting and transfer speeds, but your data is almost always protected if amit-amit ketabrak atau laptop kenapa-napa.
  5. Powerstrip : Ini bisa wajib, bisa enggak. Kadang berguna kalau kalian nugas di cafe, tapi kalian gak mati juga kalau gak punya.
  6. Write Monkey : Ini dapat meng-enhance pengalaman kalian menulis, gue menggunakan program ini saat skripsi. Fungsinya cuma satu : Biar nulis lebih enak. Cocok bagi yang jurusannya rajin ngetik. Again, lo gak akan mati kalo gak punya ini.
  7. Eventbrite : Cocok buat yang pengen cari group activities atau seminar gratisan.
  8. TIX.ID : For the time being, jangan ke bioskop dulu. Tapi TIX suka banyak promo buy1get1. Lumayan buat irit duit.
  9. Trello or Asana : Nah, sebenarnya ini wajib untuk orang kantoran (depends industrinya), tapi menurut gua kalau kalian coba aja pelajarin agile project management, mungkin performance group akan lebih naik. Ditambah ini lagi pandemi, nugas akan lebih gampang menurut gua dengan ini. Kakak-kakak yang udah kerja di kantor agile pasti bisa jelasin.
  10. Jobstreet, Kalibrr, JobsDB, Glints : For work opportunities.
  11. Halodoc : Truth be told, this app have saved my life multiple times. I would suggest a healthy diet, but having this on your phone will not hurt one bit.
  12. Pisau lipat Victorinox : Handy untuk yang berencana jadi anak alam atau bocah camping. But basically handy untuk segala situasi, sih.
  13. Aplikasi sekuritas : Bisa mulai belajar, setau gua macem MNC Sekuritas bisa mulai trading dengan Rp100.000.
  14. Discord : Lumayan handy untuk jadi basis chat angkatan. Tapi, mereka lebih cater ke gaming crowd, walaupun fiturnya sebagus Slack Enterprise, tapi entah kenapa susah banget penetrate mainstream user.
  15. To be added later...........

CUKUP TAU

  1. Netflix : Bisa patungan sama temen-temen. I don't suggest buy shady accounts.
  2. Premier League app : Seru loh bikin liga fantasy sama temen-temen.
  3. GrabKios : Lumayan bisa jual pulsa di kampus.
  4. Saran minum oleh theblackmandarin
  5. To be added later...........

JANGAN PERNAH SENTUH

  1. Kredivo dan any P2P lending app : Tolong banget jangan kejebur sama trap ini. Kalian masih mahasiswa, belom punya penghasilan tetap.
  2. PayTren or any other MLM apps : Idem
  3. Judi bola : Idem.
  4. Rokok : Idem
  5. Forex/Crypto : Idem
  6. Dota 2 : Udah gak usah sentuh.
  7. Mobile Legend : Buang-buang waktu push rank, IP lo gak naek juga.
  8. Amfetamin : Gak baek ngedrug muda-muda.
  9. Red Bull : Gak baek, bisa gak tidur.
  10. Kopi ABC/78C/botolan : Ini sama kayak Red Bull, udah pasti gak tidur.
  11. To be added later...........
Segitu dulu guys, tolong ya kakak-kakak yang sudah lulus mohon ditambah. Terima kasih!
EDIT 1 : Nambahin banyak BUANGET. Thanks mie-sedaap elonelon theblackmandarin debukosmik JanganLupaSkripsian didunianyata ysupr selemenesmilesuponme ichhassesommer ANJINGHARAM AnjingTerang lukuntul imamsupriadiBPK pm-me-your-nenen
submitted by roflpaladin to indonesia [link] [comments]

Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Swaps* (*But Were Afraid To Ask)

Hello, dummies
It's your old pal, Fuzzy.
As I'm sure you've all noticed, a lot of the stuff that gets posted here is - to put it delicately - fucking ridiculous. More backwards-ass shit gets posted to wallstreetbets than you'd see on a Westboro Baptist community message board. I mean, I had a look at the daily thread yesterday and..... yeesh. I know, I know. We all make like the divine Laura Dern circa 1992 on the daily and stick our hands deep into this steaming heap of shit to find the nuggets of valuable and/or hilarious information within (thanks for reading, BTW). I agree. I love it just the way it is too. That's what makes WSB great.
What I'm getting at is that a lot of the stuff that gets posted here - notwithstanding it being funny or interesting - is just... wrong. Like, fucking your cousin wrong. And to be clear, I mean the fucking your *first* cousin kinda wrong, before my Southerners in the back get all het up (simmer down, Billy Ray - I know Mabel's twice removed on your grand-sister's side). Truly, I try to let it slide. I do my bit to try and put you on the right path. Most of the time, I sleep easy no matter how badly I've seen someone explain what a bank liquidity crisis is. But out of all of those tens of thousands of misguided, autistic attempts at understanding the world of high finance, one thing gets so consistently - so *emphatically* - fucked up and misunderstood by you retards that last night I felt obligated at the end of a long work day to pull together this edition of Finance with Fuzzy just for you. It's so serious I'm not even going to make a u/pokimane gag. Have you guessed what it is yet? Here's a clue. It's in the title of the post.
That's right, friends. Today in the neighborhood we're going to talk all about hedging in financial markets - spots, swaps, collars, forwards, CDS, synthetic CDOs, all that fun shit. Don't worry; I'm going to explain what all the scary words mean and how they impact your OTM RH positions along the way.
We're going to break it down like this. (1) "What's a hedge, Fuzzy?" (2) Common Hedging Strategies and (3) All About ISDAs and Credit Default Swaps.
Before we begin. For the nerds and JV traders in the back (and anyone else who needs to hear this up front) - I am simplifying these descriptions for the purposes of this post. I am also obviously not going to try and cover every exotic form of hedge under the sun or give a detailed summation of what caused the financial crisis. If you are interested in something specific ask a question, but don't try and impress me with your Investopedia skills or technical points I didn't cover; I will just be forced to flex my years of IRL experience on you in the comments and you'll look like a big dummy.
TL;DR? Fuck you. There is no TL;DR. You've come this far already. What's a few more paragraphs? Put down the Cheetos and try to concentrate for the next 5-7 minutes. You'll learn something, and I promise I'll be gentle.
Ready? Let's get started.
1. The Tao of Risk: Hedging as a Way of Life
The simplest way to characterize what a hedge 'is' is to imagine every action having a binary outcome. One is bad, one is good. Red lines, green lines; uppie, downie. With me so far? Good. A 'hedge' is simply the employment of a strategy to mitigate the effect of your action having the wrong binary outcome. You wanted X, but you got Z! Frowny face. A hedge strategy introduces a third outcome. If you hedged against the possibility of Z happening, then you can wind up with Y instead. Not as good as X, but not as bad as Z. The technical definition I like to give my idiot juniors is as follows:
Utilization of a defensive strategy to mitigate risk, at a fraction of the cost to capital of the risk itself.
Congratulations. You just finished Hedging 101. "But Fuzzy, that's easy! I just sold a naked call against my 95% OTM put! I'm adequately hedged!". Spoiler alert: you're not (although good work on executing a collar, which I describe below). What I'm talking about here is what would be referred to as a 'perfect hedge'; a binary outcome where downside is totally mitigated by a risk management strategy. That's not how it works IRL. Pay attention; this is the tricky part.
You can't take a single position and conclude that you're adequately hedged because risks are fluid, not static. So you need to constantly adjust your position in order to maximize the value of the hedge and insure your position. You also need to consider exposure to more than one category of risk. There are micro (specific exposure) risks, and macro (trend exposure) risks, and both need to factor into the hedge calculus.
That's why, in the real world, the value of hedging depends entirely on the design of the hedging strategy itself. Here, when we say "value" of the hedge, we're not talking about cash money - we're talking about the intrinsic value of the hedge relative to the the risk profile of your underlying exposure. To achieve this, people hedge dynamically. In wallstreetbets terms, this means that as the value of your position changes, you need to change your hedges too. The idea is to efficiently and continuously distribute and rebalance risk across different states and periods, taking value from states in which the marginal cost of the hedge is low and putting it back into states where marginal cost of the hedge is high, until the shadow value of your underlying exposure is equalized across your positions. The punchline, I guess, is that one static position is a hedge in the same way that the finger paintings you make for your wife's boyfriend are art - it's technically correct, but you're only playing yourself by believing it.
Anyway. Obviously doing this as a small potatoes trader is hard but it's worth taking into account. Enough basic shit. So how does this work in markets?
2. A Hedging Taxonomy
The best place to start here is a practical question. What does a business need to hedge against? Think about the specific risk that an individual business faces. These are legion, so I'm just going to list a few of the key ones that apply to most corporates. (1) You have commodity risk for the shit you buy or the shit you use. (2) You have currency risk for the money you borrow. (3) You have rate risk on the debt you carry. (4) You have offtake risk for the shit you sell. Complicated, right? To help address the many and varied ways that shit can go wrong in a sophisticated market, smart operators like yours truly have devised a whole bundle of different instruments which can help you manage the risk. I might write about some of the more complicated ones in a later post if people are interested (CDO/CLOs, strip/stack hedges and bond swaps with option toggles come to mind) but let's stick to the basics for now.
(i) Swaps
A swap is one of the most common forms of hedge instrument, and they're used by pretty much everyone that can afford them. The language is complicated but the concept isn't, so pay attention and you'll be fine. This is the most important part of this section so it'll be the longest one.
Swaps are derivative contracts with two counterparties (before you ask, you can't trade 'em on an exchange - they're OTC instruments only). They're used to exchange one cash flow for another cash flow of equal expected value; doing this allows you to take speculative positions on certain financial prices or to alter the cash flows of existing assets or liabilities within a business. "Wait, Fuzz; slow down! What do you mean sets of cash flows?". Fear not, little autist. Ol' Fuzz has you covered.
The cash flows I'm talking about are referred to in swap-land as 'legs'. One leg is fixed - a set payment that's the same every time it gets paid - and the other is variable - it fluctuates (typically indexed off the price of the underlying risk that you are speculating on / protecting against). You set it up at the start so that they're notionally equal and the two legs net off; so at open, the swap is a zero NPV instrument. Here's where the fun starts. If the price that you based the variable leg of the swap on changes, the value of the swap will shift; the party on the wrong side of the move ponies up via the variable payment. It's a zero sum game.
I'll give you an example using the most vanilla swap around; an interest rate trade. Here's how it works. You borrow money from a bank, and they charge you a rate of interest. You lock the rate up front, because you're smart like that. But then - quelle surprise! - the rate gets better after you borrow. Now you're bagholding to the tune of, I don't know, 5 bps. Doesn't sound like much but on a billion dollar loan that's a lot of money (a classic example of the kind of 'small, deep hole' that's terrible for profits). Now, if you had a swap contract on the rate before you entered the trade, you're set; if the rate goes down, you get a payment under the swap. If it goes up, whatever payment you're making to the bank is netted off by the fact that you're borrowing at a sub-market rate. Win-win! Or, at least, Lose Less / Lose Less. That's the name of the game in hedging.
There are many different kinds of swaps, some of which are pretty exotic; but they're all different variations on the same theme. If your business has exposure to something which fluctuates in price, you trade swaps to hedge against the fluctuation. The valuation of swaps is also super interesting but I guarantee you that 99% of you won't understand it so I'm not going to try and explain it here although I encourage you to google it if you're interested.
Because they're OTC, none of them are filed publicly. Someeeeeetimes you see an ISDA (dsicussed below) but the confirms themselves (the individual swaps) are not filed. You can usually read about the hedging strategy in a 10-K, though. For what it's worth, most modern credit agreements ban speculative hedging. Top tip: This is occasionally something worth checking in credit agreements when you invest in businesses that are debt issuers - being able to do this increases the risk profile significantly and is particularly important in times of economic volatility (ctrl+f "non-speculative" in the credit agreement to be sure).
(ii) Forwards
A forward is a contract made today for the future delivery of an asset at a pre-agreed price. That's it. "But Fuzzy! That sounds just like a futures contract!". I know. Confusing, right? Just like a futures trade, forwards are generally used in commodity or forex land to protect against price fluctuations. The differences between forwards and futures are small but significant. I'm not going to go into super boring detail because I don't think many of you are commodities traders but it is still an important thing to understand even if you're just an RH jockey, so stick with me.
Just like swaps, forwards are OTC contracts - they're not publicly traded. This is distinct from futures, which are traded on exchanges (see The Ballad Of Big Dick Vick for some more color on this). In a forward, no money changes hands until the maturity date of the contract when delivery and receipt are carried out; price and quantity are locked in from day 1. As you now know having read about BDV, futures are marked to market daily, and normally people close them out with synthetic settlement using an inverse position. They're also liquid, and that makes them easier to unwind or close out in case shit goes sideways.
People use forwards when they absolutely have to get rid of the thing they made (or take delivery of the thing they need). If you're a miner, or a farmer, you use this shit to make sure that at the end of the production cycle, you can get rid of the shit you made (and you won't get fucked by someone taking cash settlement over delivery). If you're a buyer, you use them to guarantee that you'll get whatever the shit is that you'll need at a price agreed in advance. Because they're OTC, you can also exactly tailor them to the requirements of your particular circumstances.
These contracts are incredibly byzantine (and there are even crazier synthetic forwards you can see in money markets for the true degenerate fund managers). In my experience, only Texan oilfield magnates, commodities traders, and the weirdo forex crowd fuck with them. I (i) do not own a 10 gallon hat or a novelty size belt buckle (ii) do not wake up in the middle of the night freaking out about the price of pork fat and (iii) love greenbacks too much to care about other countries' monopoly money, so I don't fuck with them.
(iii) Collars
No, not the kind your wife is encouraging you to wear try out to 'spice things up' in the bedroom during quarantine. Collars are actually the hedging strategy most applicable to WSB. Collars deal with options! Hooray!
To execute a basic collar (also called a wrapper by tea-drinking Brits and people from the Antipodes), you buy an out of the money put while simultaneously writing a covered call on the same equity. The put protects your position against price drops and writing the call produces income that offsets the put premium. Doing this limits your tendies (you can only profit up to the strike price of the call) but also writes down your risk. If you screen large volume trades with a VOL/OI of more than 3 or 4x (and they're not bullshit biotech stocks), you can sometimes see these being constructed in real time as hedge funds protect themselves on their shorts.
(3) All About ISDAs, CDS and Synthetic CDOs
You may have heard about the mythical ISDA. Much like an indenture (discussed in my post on $F), it's a magic legal machine that lets you build swaps via trade confirms with a willing counterparty. They are very complicated legal documents and you need to be a true expert to fuck with them. Fortunately, I am, so I do. They're made of two parts; a Master (which is a form agreement that's always the same) and a Schedule (which amends the Master to include your specific terms). They are also the engine behind just about every major credit crunch of the last 10+ years.
First - a brief explainer. An ISDA is a not in and of itself a hedge - it's an umbrella contract that governs the terms of your swaps, which you use to construct your hedge position. You can trade commodities, forex, rates, whatever, all under the same ISDA.
Let me explain. Remember when we talked about swaps? Right. So. You can trade swaps on just about anything. In the late 90s and early 2000s, people had the smart idea of using other people's debt and or credit ratings as the variable leg of swap documentation. These are called credit default swaps. I was actually starting out at a bank during this time and, I gotta tell you, the only thing I can compare people's enthusiasm for this shit to was that moment in your early teens when you discover jerking off. Except, unlike your bathroom bound shame sessions to Mom's Sears catalogue, every single person you know felt that way too; and they're all doing it at once. It was a fiscal circlejerk of epic proportions, and the financial crisis was the inevitable bukkake finish. WSB autism is absolutely no comparison for the enthusiasm people had during this time for lighting each other's money on fire.
Here's how it works. You pick a company. Any company. Maybe even your own! And then you write a swap. In the swap, you define "Credit Event" with respect to that company's debt as the variable leg . And you write in... whatever you want. A ratings downgrade, default under the docs, failure to meet a leverage ratio or FCCR for a certain testing period... whatever. Now, this started out as a hedge position, just like we discussed above. The purest of intentions, of course. But then people realized - if bad shit happens, you make money. And banks... don't like calling in loans or forcing bankruptcies. Can you smell what the moral hazard is cooking?
Enter synthetic CDOs. CDOs are basically pools of asset backed securities that invest in debt (loans or bonds). They've been around for a minute but they got famous in the 2000s because a shitload of them containing subprime mortgage debt went belly up in 2008. This got a lot of publicity because a lot of sad looking rednecks got foreclosed on and were interviewed on CNBC. "OH!", the people cried. "Look at those big bad bankers buying up subprime loans! They caused this!". Wrong answer, America. The debt wasn't the problem. What a lot of people don't realize is that the real meat of the problem was not in regular way CDOs investing in bundles of shit mortgage debts in synthetic CDOs investing in CDS predicated on that debt. They're synthetic because they don't have a stake in the actual underlying debt; just the instruments riding on the coattails. The reason these are so popular (and remain so) is that smart structured attorneys and bankers like your faithful correspondent realized that an even more profitable and efficient way of building high yield products with limited downside was investing in instruments that profit from failure of debt and in instruments that rely on that debt and then hedging that exposure with other CDS instruments in paired trades, and on and on up the chain. The problem with doing this was that everyone wound up exposed to everybody else's books as a result, and when one went tits up, everybody did. Hence, recession, Basel III, etc. Thanks, Obama.
Heavy investment in CDS can also have a warping effect on the price of debt (something else that happened during the pre-financial crisis years and is starting to happen again now). This happens in three different ways. (1) Investors who previously were long on the debt hedge their position by selling CDS protection on the underlying, putting downward pressure on the debt price. (2) Investors who previously shorted the debt switch to buying CDS protection because the relatively illiquid debt (partic. when its a bond) trades at a discount below par compared to the CDS. The resulting reduction in short selling puts upward pressure on the bond price. (3) The delta in price and actual value of the debt tempts some investors to become NBTs (neg basis traders) who long the debt and purchase CDS protection. If traders can't take leverage, nothing happens to the price of the debt. If basis traders can take leverage (which is nearly always the case because they're holding a hedged position), they can push up or depress the debt price, goosing swap premiums etc. Anyway. Enough technical details.
I could keep going. This is a fascinating topic that is very poorly understood and explained, mainly because the people that caused it all still work on the street and use the same tactics today (it's also terribly taught at business schools because none of the teachers were actually around to see how this played out live). But it relates to the topic of today's lesson, so I thought I'd include it here.
Work depending, I'll be back next week with a covenant breakdown. Most upvoted ticker gets the post.
*EDIT 1\* In a total blowout, $PLAY won. So it's D&B time next week. Post will drop Monday at market open.
submitted by fuzzyblankeet to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

ASIC Regulation Thread - Regarding the proposed changes ( Australians effected the most )

I'm hopeless at formatting text, so if you think you can structure this post better take everything i write and put it into an easy to digest way. I'm just going to type out everything i know in text as fast as possible. I'm not a legal expert, I'm not somehow who understands every bit of information in the PDF's below, but i know I'm a retail trader that uses leverage to make profit which is why I'm posting this, in the hope that someone who can run a charge better than me, will.
Some of you are already aware of what might be happening, this is just a post to educate retail traders on changes that might be coming to certain brokers. This effects Australian Customers the most, but also effects those living in other countries that use Australian brokers, such as Pepperstone and others.
Last year in August 2019, ASIC ( Australian Securities and Investments Commission ) was concerned about retail traders going into Forex and Binary options without understanding these instruments properly and started sticking their noses in for tough regulation.
ASIC asked brokers and anyone with interest in the industry to write to them and explain what should and should not change from the changes they proposed, some of the proposed changes are very misguided and come from a lack of understanding exactly how OTC derivatives actually work.
I will provide the link to the paper further down so you can read it yourself and i will provide a link to all the submission made by all parties that sent submissions to ASIC, however the 2 main points of debate are:
1, To reduce the overall leverage available to retail traders to either 20:1 or 30:1. This means people who currently use leverage such as 100:1 to 500:1 and everything in between will be effected the most, even more so are those traders with relatively small accounts, meaning in order to get your foot in the door to trading you will need more capital for it to be viable.
^^ This point above is very important.
2, The removing of Binary options trading, which basically includes products like "Bet if gold will rise to this price in the next 30 seconds" This sort of stuff. So far from all the submissions from brokers and individuals nobody really cares if this changes as far as i know, though if you have concerns about this i would start voicing your disapproval. Though i would not waste your time here, all is pointing to this being eradicated completely with brokers also supporting the changes, I've never used such a product and know very little about them.
^^ This point above isn't very important and will probably be enforced in the future.
Still to this day i see retail traders not understanding leverage, they think of it as "dangerous and scary", it's not, position size is the real danger, not leverage. So ASIC is aiming to limit retail traders access to high leverage, they are claiming it is a way to protect traders who don't really understand what they are getting into by attacking leverage and not the real problem which is position size relative to your capital.
If it was truly about protecting retail traders from blowing up their accounts, they would look for ways to educate traders on "understanding position sizes and why it's important" rather than attacking leverage, but their goal is misguided or has an ulterior motive . I will give you a small example below.
EXAMPLE - We will use 2 demo accounts for demonstration purposes. If you don't understand my example, i suggest you try it for yourself. - Skip if not interested in examples.
Lets say we open 2 demo accounts with $1000 in both, one with 20:1 leverage and one with 500:1 leverage and we open an identical position on both accounts ( say a micro lot '0.01' on EURUSD ). You are safer on the 500:1 account as you don't need to put up as much margin as collateral as you would on the 20:1. If the trade we just opened goes against us and continues against us, the account with 20:1 leverage will run out of free margin a lot faster than the 500:1 account. In this simple example is shows you that leverage is not dangerous but safer and gives you a lot more breathing room. This trade was a small micro lot, so it would take hundreds of pips movements to get margin called and blow up that $1000 on each account. Lets now use a different position size to truly understand why retail traders blow up accounts and is the reason why trading can be dangerous.
This time instead of opening a micro lot of '0.01' on our $1000 dollar demo accounts, lets open a position size much larger, 5 lots. Remember we only have $1000 and we are about to open a position much larger relative to our capital ( which we should never do because we can't afford to do that ) the 20:1 probably wont even let you place that trade if you don't have enough margin as collateral or if you could open the position you would have a very tiny amount of free margin left over, meaning a small pip movement against you will instantly blow up your $1000 account. On the 500:1 account you wouldn't need to put up as much margin as collateral with more free margin if the trade goes bad, but again a small movement could blow up your account. In this example, both accounts were dangerous because the lack of understanding position sizes, opening a position you can't afford to open. This is what the true danger is, not the leverage.
Even in the second example, the higher leverage would "margin call" you out later. So i would go as far to say that lower leverage is more dangerous for you because it margin calls you out faster and just by having a lower leverage doesn't stop you from opening big positions that can blow you up in a 5 pip movement anymore, any leverage size is dangerous if you're opening positions you can't afford to open. This is also taking into consideration that no risk management is being used, with risk management higher leverage is even more powerful.
ASIC believes lowering leverage will stop people opening positions that they can't afford. When the reality is no matter how much capital you have $500, $1000, $5000, $50,000, $500,000, $5,000,000. You don't open position sizes that will blow that capital up completely with small movements. The same thing can happen on a 20:1 or 500:1 account.
Leverage is a tool, use it, if your on a lower leverage already such as 20:1, 30:1 it means your country has been regulated and you already have harder trading conditions. Just remember higher leverage allows you to open larger position sizes in total for the amount of money you own, but the issue is NOT that your using the higher leverage but because you are opening positions you can't afford, for what ever reason that is, the only fix for this is education and will not be fixed by simply lowing leverage, since you can just as easy blow up your account on low leverage just as fast or if not faster.
So what is going on?
There might ( get your tinfoil hats on ) be more that is involved here, deeper than you think, other agendas to try and stop small time retail traders from making money via OTC products, theories such as governments not wanting their citizens to be traders, rather would prefer you to get out there and work a 9 to 5 instead. Effective ways to do this would be making conditions harder with a much larger barrier of entry and the best way to increase the barrier of entry for retail traders is to limit leverage, lower leverage means you need to put up more money, less breathing room for trades, lower potential. They are limiting your upside potential and the downside stays the same, a blown account is a blow account.
Think of leverage as a weapon, a person wielding a butchers knife can probably destroy a person wielding a steak knife, but both knifes can prove fatal. They want to make sure your holding the butter knife then tell you to butcher a cow with it. 30:1 leverage is still workable and can still be profitable, but not as profitable as 500:1 accounts. This is why they are allowing professionals to use high leverage, this gives them another edge over successful retail traders who will still be trying to butcher a cow with a butter knife, while they are slaying limbs off the cow with machetes.
It's a way to hamstring you and keep you away rather than trying to "protect" you. The real danger is not leverage, they are barking up the wrong tree, how convenient to be barking up the very tree most retail traders don't fully understand ( leverage) , pass legislation to make trading conditions harder and at the same time push the narrative that trading is dangerous by making it even harder. A full circle strategy to make your trading conditions worse, so you don't succeed.
Listen carefully especially if you trade with any of the brokers that have provided their submissions to ASIC. Brokers want to seem like they are on your side and so far some of the submissions ( i haven't read them all ) have brokers willing to drop their leverage down to 30:1 because they know by dropping the leverage down it will start margin calling out their clients at a much faster rate, causing more blown up accounts / abandoned accounts with residual margin called funds, but they also know that if they make trading environments too hard less people will trade or even worse move their funds elsewhere offshore to unregulated brokers that offer higher leverage.
Right now it's all just a proposal, but as governments expand and continue to gain more control over it's citizens, it's just a matter of time till it's law, it's up to you to be vocal about it, let your broker know that if they drop their leverage, you're out, force them to fight for you.
If you have any more information related to this, or have anything to add, post below. I'm not an expert at this technical law talk, i know that i do well with 500:1 leverage and turn profits with it, it would be harder for me to do on a lower leverage, this is the reason for my post.
All related documents HERE
CP-322 ( Consultation paper 322 ) & Submissions from brokers and others.
https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/consultation-papers/cp-322-product-intervention-otc-binary-options-and-cfds/
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No, the British did not steal $45 trillion from India

This is an updated copy of the version on BadHistory. I plan to update it in accordance with the feedback I got.
I'd like to thank two people who will remain anonymous for helping me greatly with this post (you know who you are)
Three years ago a festschrift for Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri was published by Shubhra Chakrabarti, a history teacher at the University of Delhi and Utsa Patnaik, a Marxist economist who taught at JNU until 2010.
One of the essays in the festschirt by Utsa Patnaik was an attempt to quantify the "drain" undergone by India during British Rule. Her conclusion? Britain robbed India of $45 trillion (or £9.2 trillion) during their 200 or so years of rule. This figure was immensely popular, and got republished in several major news outlets (here, here, here, here (they get the number wrong) and more recently here), got a mention from the Minister of External Affairs & returns 29,100 results on Google. There's also plenty of references to it here on Reddit.
Patnaik is not the first to calculate such a figure. Angus Maddison thought it was £100 million, Simon Digby said £1 billion, Javier Estaban said £40 million see Roy (2019). The huge range of figures should set off some alarm bells.
So how did Patnaik calculate this (shockingly large) figure? Well, even though I don't have access to the festschrift, she conveniently has written an article detailing her methodology here. Let's have a look.
How exactly did the British manage to diddle us and drain our wealth’ ? was the question that Basudev Chatterjee (later editor of a volume in the Towards Freedom project) had posed to me 50 years ago when we were fellow-students abroad.
This is begging the question.
After decades of research I find that using India’s commodity export surplus as the measure and applying an interest rate of 5%, the total drain from 1765 to 1938, compounded up to 2016, comes to £9.2 trillion; since $4.86 exchanged for £1 those days, this sum equals about $45 trillion.
This is completely meaningless. To understand why it's meaningless consider India's annual coconut exports. These are almost certainly a surplus but the surplus in trade is countered by the other country buying the product (indeed, by definition, trade surpluses contribute to the GDP of a nation which hardly plays into intuitive conceptualisations of drain).
Furthermore, Dewey (2019) critiques the 5% interest rate.
She [Patnaik] consistently adopts statistical assumptions (such as compound interest at a rate of 5% per annum over centuries) that exaggerate the magnitude of the drain
Moving on:
The exact mechanism of drain, or transfers from India to Britain was quite simple.
Convenient.
Drain theory possessed the political merit of being easily grasped by a nation of peasants. [...] No other idea could arouse people than the thought that they were being taxed so that others in far off lands might live in comfort. [...] It was, therefore, inevitable that the drain theory became the main staple of nationalist political agitation during the Gandhian era.
- Chandra et al. (1989)
The key factor was Britain’s control over our taxation revenues combined with control over India’s financial gold and forex earnings from its booming commodity export surplus with the world. Simply put, Britain used locally raised rupee tax revenues to pay for its net import of goods, a highly abnormal use of budgetary funds not seen in any sovereign country.
The issue with figures like these is they all make certain methodological assumptions that are impossible to prove. From Roy in Frankema et al. (2019):
the "drain theory" of Indian poverty cannot be tested with evidence, for several reasons. First, it rests on the counterfactual that any money saved on account of factor payments abroad would translate into domestic investment, which can never be proved. Second, it rests on "the primitive notion that all payments to foreigners are "drain"", that is, on the assumption that these payments did not contribute to domestic national income to the equivalent extent (Kumar 1985, 384; see also Chaudhuri 1968). Again, this cannot be tested. [...] Fourth, while British officers serving India did receive salaries that were many times that of the average income in India, a paper using cross-country data shows that colonies with better paid officers were governed better (Jones 2013).
Indeed, drain theory rests on some very weak foundations. This, in of itself, should be enough to dismiss any of the other figures that get thrown out. Nonetheless, I felt it would be a useful exercise to continue exploring Patnaik's take on drain theory.
The East India Company from 1765 onwards allocated every year up to one-third of Indian budgetary revenues net of collection costs, to buy a large volume of goods for direct import into Britain, far in excess of that country’s own needs.
So what's going on here? Well Roy (2019) explains it better:
Colonial India ran an export surplus, which, together with foreign investment, was used to pay for services purchased from Britain. These payments included interest on public debt, salaries, and pensions paid to government offcers who had come from Britain, salaries of managers and engineers, guaranteed profts paid to railway companies, and repatriated business profts. How do we know that any of these payments involved paying too much? The answer is we do not.
So what was really happening is the government was paying its workers for services (as well as guaranteeing profits - to promote investment - something the GoI does today Dalal (2019), and promoting business in India), and those workers were remitting some of that money to Britain. This is hardly a drain (unless, of course, Indian diaspora around the world today are "draining" it). In some cases, the remittances would take the form of goods (as described) see Chaudhuri (1983):
It is obvious that these debit items were financed through the export surplus on merchandise account, and later, when railway construction started on a large scale in India, through capital import. Until 1833 the East India Company followed a cumbersome method in remitting the annual home charges. This was to purchase export commodities in India out of revenue, which were then shipped to London and the proceeds from their sale handed over to the home treasury.
While Roy's earlier point argues better paid officers governed better, it is honestly impossible to say what part of the repatriated export surplus was a drain, and what was not. However calling all of it a drain is definitely misguided.
It's worth noting that Patnaik seems to make no attempt to quantify the benefits of the Raj either, Dewey (2019)'s 2nd criticism:
she [Patnaik] consistently ignores research that would tend to cut the economic impact of the drain down to size, such as the work on the sources of investment during the industrial revolution (which shows that industrialisation was financed by the ploughed-back profits of industrialists) or the costs of empire school (which stresses the high price of imperial defence)

Since tropical goods were highly prized in other cold temperate countries which could never produce them, in effect these free goods represented international purchasing power for Britain which kept a part for its own use and re-exported the balance to other countries in Europe and North America against import of food grains, iron and other goods in which it was deficient.
Re-exports necessarily adds value to goods when the goods are processed and when the goods are transported. The country with the largest navy at the time would presumably be in very good stead to do the latter.
The British historians Phyllis Deane and WA Cole presented an incorrect estimate of Britain’s 18th-19th century trade volume, by leaving out re-exports completely. I found that by 1800 Britain’s total trade was 62% higher than their estimate, on applying the correct definition of trade including re-exports, that is used by the United Nations and by all other international organisations.
While interesting, and certainly expected for such an old book, re-exporting necessarily adds value to goods.
When the Crown took over from the Company, from 1861 a clever system was developed under which all of India’s financial gold and forex earnings from its fast-rising commodity export surplus with the world, was intercepted and appropriated by Britain. As before up to a third of India’s rising budgetary revenues was not spent domestically but was set aside as ‘expenditure abroad’.
So, what does this mean? Britain appropriated all of India's earnings, and then spent a third of it aboard? Not exactly. She is describing home charges see Roy (2019) again:
Some of the expenditures on defense and administration were made in sterling and went out of the country. This payment by the government was known as the Home Charges. For example, interest payment on loans raised to finance construction of railways and irrigation works, pensions paid to retired officers, and purchase of stores, were payments in sterling. [...] almost all money that the government paid abroad corresponded to the purchase of a service from abroad. [...] The balance of payments system that emerged after 1800 was based on standard business principles. India bought something and paid for it. State revenues were used to pay for wages of people hired abroad, pay for interest on loans raised abroad, and repatriation of profits on foreign investments coming into India. These were legitimate market transactions.
Indeed, if paying for what you buy is drain, then several billions of us are drained every day.
The Secretary of State for India in Council, based in London, invited foreign importers to deposit with him the payment (in gold, sterling and their own currencies) for their net imports from India, and these gold and forex payments disappeared into the yawning maw of the SoS’s account in the Bank of England.
It should be noted that India having two heads was beneficial, and encouraged investment per Roy (2019):
The fact that the India Office in London managed a part of the monetary system made India creditworthy, stabilized its currency, and encouraged foreign savers to put money into railways and private enterprise in India. Current research on the history of public debt shows that stable and large colonies found it easier to borrow abroad than independent economies because the investors trusted the guarantee of the colonist powers.

Against India’s net foreign earnings he issued bills, termed Council bills (CBs), to an equivalent rupee value. The rate (between gold-linked sterling and silver rupee) at which the bills were issued, was carefully adjusted to the last farthing, so that foreigners would never find it more profitable to ship financial gold as payment directly to Indians, compared to using the CB route. Foreign importers then sent the CBs by post or by telegraph to the export houses in India, that via the exchange banks were paid out of the budgeted provision of sums under ‘expenditure abroad’, and the exporters in turn paid the producers (peasants and artisans) from whom they sourced the goods.
Sunderland (2013) argues CBs had two main roles (and neither were part of a grand plot to keep gold out of India):
Council bills had two roles. They firstly promoted trade by handing the IO some control of the rate of exchange and allowing the exchange banks to remit funds to India and to hedge currency transaction risks. They also enabled the Indian government to transfer cash to England for the payment of its UK commitments.

The United Nations (1962) historical data for 1900 to 1960, show that for three decades up to 1928 (and very likely earlier too) India posted the second highest merchandise export surplus in the world, with USA in the first position. Not only were Indians deprived of every bit of the enormous international purchasing power they had earned over 175 years, even its rupee equivalent was not issued to them since not even the colonial government was credited with any part of India’s net gold and forex earnings against which it could issue rupees. The sleight-of-hand employed, namely ‘paying’ producers out of their own taxes, made India’s export surplus unrequited and constituted a tax-financed drain to the metropolis, as had been correctly pointed out by those highly insightful classical writers, Dadabhai Naoroji and RCDutt.
It doesn't appear that others appreciate their insight Roy (2019):
K. N. Chaudhuri rightly calls such practice ‘confused’ economics ‘coloured by political feelings’.

Surplus budgets to effect such heavy tax-financed transfers had a severe employment–reducing and income-deflating effect: mass consumption was squeezed in order to release export goods. Per capita annual foodgrains absorption in British India declined from 210 kg. during the period 1904-09, to 157 kg. during 1937-41, and to only 137 kg by 1946.
Dewey (1978) points out reliability issues with Indian agriculutural statistics, however this calorie decline persists to this day. Some of it is attributed to less food being consumed at home Smith (2015), a lower infectious disease burden Duh & Spears (2016) and diversified diets Vankatesh et al. (2016).
If even a part of its enormous foreign earnings had been credited to it and not entirely siphoned off, India could have imported modern technology to build up an industrial structure as Japan was doing.
This is, unfortunately, impossible to prove. Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication that India would've united (this is arguably more plausible than the given counterfactual1). Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication India would not have been nuked in WW2, much like Japan. Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication India would not have been invaded by lizard people, much like Japan. The list continues eternally.
Nevertheless, I will charitably examine the given counterfactual anyway. Did pre-colonial India have industrial potential? The answer is a resounding no.
From Gupta (1980):
This article starts from the premise that while economic categories - the extent of commodity production, wage labour, monetarisation of the economy, etc - should be the basis for any analysis of the production relations of pre-British India, it is the nature of class struggles arising out of particular class alignments that finally gives the decisive twist to social change. Arguing on this premise, and analysing the available evidence, this article concludes that there was little potential for industrial revolution before the British arrived in India because, whatever might have been the character of economic categories of that period, the class relations had not sufficiently matured to develop productive forces and the required class struggle for a 'revolution' to take place.
A view echoed in Raychaudhuri (1983):
Yet all of this did not amount to an economic situation comparable to that of western Europe on the eve of the industrial revolution. Her technology - in agriculture as well as manufacturers - had by and large been stagnant for centuries. [...] The weakness of the Indian economy in the mid-eighteenth century, as compared to pre-industrial Europe was not simply a matter of technology and commercial and industrial organization. No scientific or geographical revolution formed part of the eighteenth-century Indian's historical experience. [...] Spontaneous movement towards industrialisation is unlikely in such a situation.
So now we've established India did not have industrial potential, was India similar to Japan just before the Meiji era? The answer, yet again, unsurprisingly, is no. Japan's economic situation was not comparable to India's, which allowed for Japan to finance its revolution. From Yasuba (1986):
All in all, the Japanese standard of living may not have been much below the English standard of living before industrialization, and both of them may have been considerably higher than the Indian standard of living. We can no longer say that Japan started from a pathetically low economic level and achieved a rapid or even "miraculous" economic growth. Japan's per capita income was almost as high as in Western Europe before industrialization, and it was possible for Japan to produce surplus in the Meiji Period to finance private and public capital formation.
The circumstances that led to Meiji Japan were extremely unique. See Tomlinson (1985):
Most modern comparisons between India and Japan, written by either Indianists or Japanese specialists, stress instead that industrial growth in Meiji Japan was the product of unique features that were not reproducible elsewhere. [...] it is undoubtably true that Japan's progress to industrialization has been unique and unrepeatable
So there you have it. Unsubstantiated statistical assumptions, calling any number you can a drain & assuming a counterfactual for no good reason gets you this $45 trillion number. Hopefully that's enough to bury it in the ground.
1. Several authors have affirmed that Indian identity is a colonial artefact. For example see Rajan 1969:
Perhaps the single greatest and most enduring impact of British rule over India is that it created an Indian nation, in the modern political sense. After centuries of rule by different dynasties overparts of the Indian sub-continent, and after about 100 years of British rule, Indians ceased to be merely Bengalis, Maharashtrians,or Tamils, linguistically and culturally.
or see Bryant 2000:
But then, it would be anachronistic to condemn eighteenth-century Indians, who served the British, as collaborators, when the notion of 'democratic' nationalism or of an Indian 'nation' did not then exist. [...] Indians who fought for them, differed from the Europeans in having a primary attachment to a non-belligerent religion, family and local chief, which was stronger than any identity they might have with a more remote prince or 'nation'.

Bibliography

Chakrabarti, Shubra & Patnaik, Utsa (2018). Agrarian and other histories: Essays for Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri. Colombia University Press
Hickel, Jason (2018). How the British stole $45 trillion from India. The Guardian
Bhuyan, Aroonim & Sharma, Krishan (2019). The Great Loot: How the British stole $45 trillion from India. Indiapost
Monbiot, George (2020). English Landowners have stolen our rights. It is time to reclaim them. The Guardian
Tsjeng, Zing (2020). How Britain Stole $45 trillion from India with trains | Empires of Dirt. Vice
Chaudhury, Dipanjan (2019). British looted $45 trillion from India in today’s value: Jaishankar. The Economic Times
Roy, Tirthankar (2019). How British rule changed India's economy: The Paradox of the Raj. Palgrave Macmillan
Patnaik, Utsa (2018). How the British impoverished India. Hindustan Times
Tuovila, Alicia (2019). Expenditure method. Investopedia
Dewey, Clive (2019). Changing the guard: The dissolution of the nationalist–Marxist orthodoxy in the agrarian and agricultural history of India. The Indian Economic & Social History Review
Chandra, Bipan et al. (1989). India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947. Penguin Books
Frankema, Ewout & Booth, Anne (2019). Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial State in Asia and Africa, c. 1850-1960. Cambridge University Press
Dalal, Sucheta (2019). IL&FS Controversy: Centre is Paying Up on Sovereign Guarantees to ADB, KfW for Group's Loan. TheWire
Chaudhuri, K.N. (1983). X - Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments (1757–1947). Cambridge University Press
Sunderland, David (2013). Financing the Raj: The City of London and Colonial India, 1858-1940. Boydell Press
Dewey, Clive (1978). Patwari and Chaukidar: Subordinate officials and the reliability of India’s agricultural statistics. Athlone Press
Smith, Lisa (2015). The great Indian calorie debate: Explaining rising undernourishment during India’s rapid economic growth. Food Policy
Duh, Josephine & Spears, Dean (2016). Health and Hunger: Disease, Energy Needs, and the Indian Calorie Consumption Puzzle. The Economic Journal
Vankatesh, P. et al. (2016). Relationship between Food Production and Consumption Diversity in India – Empirical Evidences from Cross Section Analysis. Agricultural Economics Research Review
Gupta, Shaibal (1980). Potential of Industrial Revolution in Pre-British India. Economic and Political Weekly
Raychaudhuri, Tapan (1983). I - The mid-eighteenth-century background. Cambridge University Press
Yasuba, Yasukichi (1986). Standard of Living in Japan Before Industrialization: From what Level did Japan Begin? A Comment. The Journal of Economic History
Tomblinson, B.R. (1985). Writing History Sideways: Lessons for Indian Economic Historians from Meiji Japan. Cambridge University Press
Rajan, M.S. (1969). The Impact of British Rule in India. Journal of Contemporary History
Bryant, G.J. (2000). Indigenous Mercenaries in the Service of European Imperialists: The Case of the Sepoys in the Early British Indian Army, 1750-1800. War in History
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Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad (5199.KL)


https://preview.redd.it/gp18bjnlabr41.jpg?width=768&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=6054e7f52e8d52da403016139ae43e0e799abf15
Download PDF of this article here: https://docdro.id/6eLgUPo
In light of the recent fall in oil prices due to the Saudi-Russian dispute and dampening demand for oil due to the lockdowns implemented globally, O&G stocks have taken a severe beating, falling approximately 50% from their highs at the beginning of the year. Not spared from this onslaught is Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad (Hibiscus), a listed oil and gas (O&G) exploration and production (E&P) company.
Why invest in O&G stocks in this particularly uncertain period? For one, valuations of these stocks have fallen to multi-year lows, bringing the potential ROI on these stocks to attractive levels. Oil prices are cyclical, and are bound to return to the mean given a sufficiently long time horizon. The trick is to find those companies who can survive through this downturn and emerge into “normal” profitability once oil prices rebound.
In this article, I will explore the upsides and downsides of investing in Hibiscus. I will do my best to cater this report to newcomers to the O&G industry – rather than address exclusively experts and veterans of the O&G sector. As an equity analyst, I aim to provide a view on the company primarily, and will generally refrain from providing macro views on oil or opinions about secular trends of the sector. I hope you enjoy reading it!
Stock code: 5199.KL
Stock name: Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad
Financial information and financial reports: https://www.malaysiastock.biz/Corporate-Infomation.aspx?securityCode=5199
Company website: https://www.hibiscuspetroleum.com/

Company Snapshot

Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad (5199.KL) is an oil and gas (O&G) upstream exploration and production (E&P) company located in Malaysia. As an E&P company, their business can be basically described as:
· looking for oil,
· drawing it out of the ground, and
· selling it on global oil markets.
This means Hibiscus’s profits are particularly exposed to fluctuating oil prices. With oil prices falling to sub-$30 from about $60 at the beginning of the year, Hibiscus’s stock price has also fallen by about 50% YTD – from around RM 1.00 to RM 0.45 (as of 5 April 2020).
https://preview.redd.it/3dqc4jraabr41.png?width=641&format=png&auto=webp&s=7ba0e8614c4e9d781edfc670016a874b90560684
https://preview.redd.it/lvdkrf0cabr41.png?width=356&format=png&auto=webp&s=46f250a713887b06986932fa475dc59c7c28582e
While the company is domiciled in Malaysia, its two main oil producing fields are located in both Malaysia and the UK. The Malaysian oil field is commonly referred to as the North Sabah field, while the UK oil field is commonly referred to as the Anasuria oil field. Hibiscus has licenses to other oil fields in different parts of the world, notably the Marigold/Sunflower oil fields in the UK and the VIC cluster in Australia, but its revenues and profits mainly stem from the former two oil producing fields.
Given that it’s a small player and has only two primary producing oil fields, it’s not surprising that Hibiscus sells its oil to a concentrated pool of customers, with 2 of them representing 80% of its revenues (i.e. Petronas and BP). Fortunately, both these customers are oil supermajors, and are unlikely to default on their obligations despite low oil prices.
At RM 0.45 per share, the market capitalization is RM 714.7m and it has a trailing PE ratio of about 5x. It doesn’t carry any debt, and it hasn’t paid a dividend in its listing history. The MD, Mr. Kenneth Gerard Pereira, owns about 10% of the company’s outstanding shares.

Reserves (Total recoverable oil) & Production (bbl/day)

To begin analyzing the company, it’s necessary to understand a little of the industry jargon. We’ll start with Reserves and Production.
In general, there are three types of categories for a company’s recoverable oil volumes – Reserves, Contingent Resources and Prospective Resources. Reserves are those oil fields which are “commercial”, which is defined as below:
As defined by the SPE PRMS, Reserves are “… quantities of petroleum anticipated to be commercially recoverable by application of development projects to known accumulations from a given date forward under defined conditions.” Therefore, Reserves must be discovered (by drilling, recoverable (with current technology), remaining in the subsurface (at the effective date of the evaluation) and “commercial” based on the development project proposed.)
Note that Reserves are associated with development projects. To be considered as “commercial”, there must be a firm intention to proceed with the project in a reasonable time frame (typically 5 years, and such intention must be based upon all of the following criteria:)
- A reasonable assessment of the future economics of the development project meeting defined investment and operating criteria; - A reasonable expectation that there will be a market for all or at least the expected sales quantities of production required to justify development; - Evidence that the necessary production and transportation facilities are available or can be made available; and - Evidence that legal, contractual, environmental and other social and economic concerns will allow for the actual implementation of the recovery project being evaluated.
Contingent Resources and Prospective Resources are further defined as below:
- Contingent Resources: potentially recoverable volumes associated with a development plan that targets discovered volumes but is not (yet commercial (as defined above); and) - Prospective Resources: potentially recoverable volumes associated with a development plan that targets as yet undiscovered volumes.
In the industry lingo, we generally refer to Reserves as ‘P’ and Contingent Resources as ‘C’. These ‘P’ and ‘C’ resources can be further categorized into 1P/2P/3P resources and 1C/2C/3C resources, each referring to a low/medium/high estimate of the company’s potential recoverable oil volumes:
- Low/1C/1P estimate: there should be reasonable certainty that volumes actually recovered will equal or exceed the estimate; - Best/2C/2P estimate: there should be an equal likelihood of the actual volumes of petroleum being larger or smaller than the estimate; and - High/3C/3P estimate: there is a low probability that the estimate will be exceeded.
Hence in the E&P industry, it is easy to see why most investors and analysts refer to the 2P estimate as the best estimate for a company’s actual recoverable oil volumes. This is because 2P reserves (‘2P’ referring to ‘Proved and Probable’) are a middle estimate of the recoverable oil volumes legally recognized as “commercial”.
However, there’s nothing stopping you from including 2C resources (riskier) or utilizing 1P resources (conservative) as your estimate for total recoverable oil volumes, depending on your risk appetite. In this instance, the company has provided a snapshot of its 2P and 2C resources in its analyst presentation:
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Basically, what the company is saying here is that by 2021, it will have classified as 2P reserves at least 23.7 million bbl from its Anasuria field and 20.5 million bbl from its North Sabah field – for total 2P reserves of 44.2 million bbl (we are ignoring the Australian VIC cluster as it is only estimated to reach first oil by 2022).
Furthermore, the company is stating that they have discovered (but not yet legally classified as “commercial”) a further 71 million bbl of oil from both the Anasuria and North Sabah fields, as well as the Marigold/Sunflower fields. If we include these 2C resources, the total potential recoverable oil volumes could exceed 100 million bbl.
In this report, we shall explore all valuation scenarios giving consideration to both 2P and 2C resources.
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The company further targets a 2021 production rate of 20,000 bbl (LTM: 8,000 bbl), which includes 5,000 bbl from its Anasuria field (LTM: 2,500 bbl) and 7,000 bbl from its North Sabah field (LTM: 5,300 bbl).
This is a substantial increase in forecasted production from both existing and prospective oil fields. If it materializes, annual production rate could be as high as 7,300 mmbbl, and 2021 revenues (given FY20 USD/bbl of $60) could exceed RM 1.5 billion (FY20: RM 988 million).
However, this targeted forecast is quite a stretch from current production levels. Nevertheless, we shall consider all provided information in estimating a valuation for Hibiscus.
To understand Hibiscus’s oil production capacity and forecast its revenues and profits, we need to have a better appreciation of the performance of its two main cash-generating assets – the North Sabah field and the Anasuria field.

North Sabah oil field
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Hibiscus owns a 50% interest in the North Sabah field together with its partner Petronas, and has production rights over the field up to year 2040. The asset contains 4 oil fields, namely the St Joseph field, South Furious field, SF 30 field and Barton field.
For the sake of brevity, we shall not delve deep into the operational aspects of the fields or the contractual nature of its production sharing contract (PSC). We’ll just focus on the factors which relate to its financial performance. These are:
· Average uptime
· Total oil sold
· Average realized oil price
· Average OPEX per bbl
With regards to average uptime, we can see that the company maintains relative high facility availability, exceeding 90% uptime in all quarters of the LTM with exception of Jul-Sep 2019. The dip in average uptime was due to production enhancement projects and maintenance activities undertaken to improve the production capacity of the St Joseph and SF30 oil fields.
Hence, we can conclude that management has a good handle on operational performance. It also implies that there is little room for further improvement in production resulting from increased uptime.
As North Sabah is under a production sharing contract (PSC), there is a distinction between gross oil production and net oil production. The former relates to total oil drawn out of the ground, whereas the latter refers to Hibiscus’s share of oil production after taxes, royalties and expenses are accounted for. In this case, we want to pay attention to net oil production, not gross.
We can arrive at Hibiscus’s total oil sold for the last twelve months (LTM) by adding up the total oil sold for each of the last 4 quarters. Summing up the figures yields total oil sold for the LTM of approximately 2,075,305 bbl.
Then, we can arrive at an average realized oil price over the LTM by averaging the average realized oil price for the last 4 quarters, giving us an average realized oil price over the LTM of USD 68.57/bbl. We can do the same for average OPEX per bbl, giving us an average OPEX per bbl over the LTM of USD 13.23/bbl.
Thus, we can sum up the above financial performance of the North Sabah field with the following figures:
· Total oil sold: 2,075,305 bbl
· Average realized oil price: USD 68.57/bbl
· Average OPEX per bbl: USD 13.23/bbl

Anasuria oil field
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Doing the same exercise as above for the Anasuria field, we arrive at the following financial performance for the Anasuria field:
· Total oil sold: 1,073,304 bbl
· Average realized oil price: USD 63.57/bbl
· Average OPEX per bbl: USD 23.22/bbl
As gas production is relatively immaterial, and to be conservative, we shall only consider the crude oil production from the Anasuria field in forecasting revenues.

Valuation (Method 1)

Putting the figures from both oil fields together, we get the following data:
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Given that we have determined LTM EBITDA of RM 632m, the next step would be to subtract ITDA (interest, tax, depreciation & amortization) from it to obtain estimated LTM Net Profit. Using FY2020’s ITDA of approximately RM 318m as a guideline, we arrive at an estimated LTM Net Profit of RM 314m (FY20: 230m). Given the current market capitalization of RM 714.7m, this implies a trailing LTM PE of 2.3x.
Performing a sensitivity analysis given different oil prices, we arrive at the following net profit table for the company under different oil price scenarios, assuming oil production rate and ITDA remain constant:
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From the above exercise, it becomes apparent that Hibiscus has a breakeven oil price of about USD 41.8863/bbl, and has a lot of operating leverage given the exponential rate of increase in its Net Profit with each consequent increase in oil prices.
Considering that the oil production rate (EBITDA) is likely to increase faster than ITDA’s proportion to revenues (fixed costs), at an implied PE of 4.33x, it seems likely that an investment in Hibiscus will be profitable over the next 10 years (with the assumption that oil prices will revert to the mean in the long-term).

Valuation (Method 2)

Of course, there are a lot of assumptions behind the above method of valuation. Hence, it would be prudent to perform multiple methods of valuation and compare the figures to one another.
As opposed to the profit/loss assessment in Valuation (Method 1), another way of performing a valuation would be to estimate its balance sheet value, i.e. total revenues from 2P Reserves, and assign a reasonable margin to it.
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From the above, we understand that Hibiscus’s 2P reserves from the North Sabah and Anasuria fields alone are approximately 44.2 mmbbl (we ignore contribution from Australia’s VIC cluster as it hasn’t been developed yet).
Doing a similar sensitivity analysis of different oil prices as above, we arrive at the following estimated total revenues and accumulated net profit:
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Let’s assume that the above average of RM 9.68 billion in total realizable revenues from current 2P reserves holds true. If we assign a conservative Net Profit margin of 15% (FY20: 23%; past 5 years average: 16%), we arrive at estimated accumulated Net Profit from 2P Reserves of RM 1.452 billion. Given the current market capitalization of RM 714 million, we might be able to say that the equity is worth about twice the current share price.
However, it is understandable that some readers might feel that the figures used in the above estimate (e.g. net profit margin of 15%) were randomly plucked from the sky. So how do we reconcile them with figures from the financial statements? Fortunately, there appears to be a way to do just that.
Intangible Assets
I refer you to a figure in the financial statements which provides a shortcut to the valuation of 2P Reserves. This is the carrying value of Intangible Assets on the Balance Sheet.
As of 2QFY21, that amount was RM 1,468,860,000 (i.e. RM 1.468 billion).
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Quite coincidentally, one might observe that this figure is dangerously close to the estimated accumulated Net Profit from 2P Reserves of RM 1.452 billion we calculated earlier. But why would this amount matter at all?
To answer that, I refer you to the notes of the Annual Report FY20 (AR20). On page 148 of the AR20, we find the following two paragraphs:
E&E assets comprise of rights and concession and conventional studies. Following the acquisition of a concession right to explore a licensed area, the costs incurred such as geological and geophysical surveys, drilling, commercial appraisal costs and other directly attributable costs of exploration and appraisal including technical and administrative costs, are capitalised as conventional studies, presented as intangible assets.
E&E assets are assessed for impairment when facts and circumstances suggest that the carrying amount of an E&E asset may exceed its recoverable amount. The Group will allocate E&E assets to cash generating unit (“CGU”s or groups of CGUs for the purpose of assessing such assets for impairment. Each CGU or group of units to which an E&E asset is allocated will not be larger than an operating segment as disclosed in Note 39 to the financial statements.)
Hence, we can determine that firstly, the intangible asset value represents capitalized costs of acquisition of the oil fields, including technical exploration costs and costs of acquiring the relevant licenses. Secondly, an impairment review will be carried out when “the carrying amount of an E&E asset may exceed its recoverable amount”, with E&E assets being allocated to “cash generating units” (CGU) for the purposes of assessment.
On page 169 of the AR20, we find the following:
Carrying amounts of the Group’s intangible assets, oil and gas assets and FPSO are reviewed for possible impairment annually including any indicators of impairment. For the purpose of assessing impairment, assets are grouped at the lowest level CGUs for which there is a separately identifiable cash flow available. These CGUs are based on operating areas, represented by the 2011 North Sabah EOR PSC (“North Sabah”, the Anasuria Cluster, the Marigold and Sunflower fields, the VIC/P57 exploration permit (“VIC/P57”) and the VIC/L31 production license (“VIC/L31”).)
So apparently, the CGUs that have been assigned refer to the respective oil producing fields, two of which include the North Sabah field and the Anasuria field. In order to perform the impairment review, estimates of future cash flow will be made by management to assess the “recoverable amount” (as described above), subject to assumptions and an appropriate discount rate.
Hence, what we can gather up to now is that management will estimate future recoverable cash flows from a CGU (i.e. the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields), compare that to their carrying value, and perform an impairment if their future recoverable cash flows are less than their carrying value. In other words, if estimated accumulated profits from the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields are less than their carrying value, an impairment is required.
So where do we find the carrying values for the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields? Further down on page 184 in the AR20, we see the following:
Included in rights and concession are the carrying amounts of producing field licenses in the Anasuria Cluster amounting to RM668,211,518 (2018: RM687,664,530, producing field licenses in North Sabah amounting to RM471,031,008 (2018: RM414,333,116))
Hence, we can determine that the carrying values for the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields are RM 471m and RM 668m respectively. But where do we find the future recoverable cash flows of the fields as estimated by management, and what are the assumptions used in that calculation?
Fortunately, we find just that on page 185:
17 INTANGIBLE ASSETS (CONTINUED)
(a Anasuria Cluster)
The Directors have concluded that there is no impairment indicator for Anasuria Cluster during the current financial year. In the previous financial year, due to uncertainties in crude oil prices, the Group has assessed the recoverable amount of the intangible assets, oil and gas assets and FPSO relating to the Anasuria Cluster. The recoverable amount is determined using the FVLCTS model based on discounted cash flows (“DCF” derived from the expected cash in/outflow pattern over the production lives.)
The key assumptions used to determine the recoverable amount for the Anasuria Cluster were as follows:
(i Discount rate of 10%;)
(ii Future cost inflation factor of 2% per annum;)
(iii Oil price forecast based on the oil price forward curve from independent parties; and,)
(iv Oil production profile based on the assessment by independent oil and gas reserve experts.)
Based on the assessments performed, the Directors concluded that the recoverable amount calculated based on the valuation model is higher than the carrying amount.
(b North Sabah)
The acquisition of the North Sabah assets was completed in the previous financial year. Details of the acquisition are as disclosed in Note 15 to the financial statements.
The Directors have concluded that there is no impairment indicator for North Sabah during the current financial year.
Here, we can see that the recoverable amount of the Anasuria field was estimated based on a DCF of expected future cash flows over the production life of the asset. The key assumptions used by management all seem appropriate, including a discount rate of 10% and oil price and oil production estimates based on independent assessment. From there, management concludes that the recoverable amount of the Anasuria field is higher than its carrying amount (i.e. no impairment required). Likewise, for the North Sabah field.
How do we interpret this? Basically, what management is saying is that given a 10% discount rate and independent oil price and oil production estimates, the accumulated profits (i.e. recoverable amount) from both the North Sabah and the Anasuria fields exceed their carrying amounts of RM 471m and RM 668m respectively.
In other words, according to management’s own estimates, the carrying value of the Intangible Assets of RM 1.468 billion approximates the accumulated Net Profit recoverable from 2P reserves.
To conclude Valuation (Method 2), we arrive at the following:

Our estimates Management estimates
Accumulated Net Profit from 2P Reserves RM 1.452 billion RM 1.468 billion

Financials

By now, we have established the basic economics of Hibiscus’s business, including its revenues (i.e. oil production and oil price scenarios), costs (OPEX, ITDA), profitability (breakeven, future earnings potential) and balance sheet value (2P reserves, valuation). Moving on, we want to gain a deeper understanding of the 3 statements to anticipate any blind spots and risks. We’ll refer to the financial statements of both the FY20 annual report and the 2Q21 quarterly report in this analysis.
For the sake of brevity, I’ll only point out those line items which need extra attention, and skip over the rest. Feel free to go through the financial statements on your own to gain a better familiarity of the business.
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Income Statement
First, we’ll start with the Income Statement on page 135 of the AR20. Revenues are straightforward, as we’ve discussed above. Cost of Sales and Administrative Expenses fall under the jurisdiction of OPEX, which we’ve also seen earlier. Other Expenses are mostly made up of Depreciation & Amortization of RM 115m.
Finance Costs are where things start to get tricky. Why does a company which carries no debt have such huge amounts of finance costs? The reason can be found in Note 8, where it is revealed that the bulk of finance costs relate to the unwinding of discount of provision for decommissioning costs of RM 25m (Note 32).
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This actually refers to the expected future costs of restoring the Anasuria and North Sabah fields to their original condition once the oil reserves have been depleted. Accounting standards require the company to provide for these decommissioning costs as they are estimable and probable. The way the decommissioning costs are accounted for is the same as an amortized loan, where the initial carrying value is recognized as a liability and the discount rate applied is reversed each year as an expense on the Income Statement. However, these expenses are largely non-cash in nature and do not necessitate a cash outflow every year (FY20: RM 69m).
Unwinding of discount on non-current other payables of RM 12m relate to contractual payments to the North Sabah sellers. We will discuss it later.
Taxation is another tricky subject, and is even more significant than Finance Costs at RM 161m. In gist, Hibiscus is subject to the 38% PITA (Petroleum Income Tax Act) under Malaysian jurisdiction, and the 30% Petroleum tax + 10% Supplementary tax under UK jurisdiction. Of the RM 161m, RM 41m of it relates to deferred tax which originates from the difference between tax treatment and accounting treatment on capitalized assets (accelerated depreciation vs straight-line depreciation). Nonetheless, what you should take away from this is that the tax expense is a tangible expense and material to breakeven analysis.
Fortunately, tax is a variable expense, and should not materially impact the cash flow of Hibiscus in today’s low oil price environment.
Note: Cash outflows for Tax Paid in FY20 was RM 97m, substantially below the RM 161m tax expense.
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Balance Sheet
The balance sheet of Hibiscus is unexciting; I’ll just bring your attention to those line items which need additional scrutiny. I’ll use the figures in the latest 2Q21 quarterly report (2Q21) and refer to the notes in AR20 for clarity.
We’ve already discussed Intangible Assets in the section above, so I won’t dwell on it again.
Moving on, the company has Equipment of RM 582m, largely relating to O&G assets (e.g. the Anasuria FPSO vessel and CAPEX incurred on production enhancement projects). Restricted cash and bank balances represent contractual obligations for decommissioning costs of the Anasuria Cluster, and are inaccessible for use in operations.
Inventories are relatively low, despite Hibiscus being an E&P company, so forex fluctuations on carrying value of inventories are relatively immaterial. Trade receivables largely relate to entitlements from Petronas and BP (both oil supermajors), and are hence quite safe from impairment. Other receivables, deposits and prepayments are significant as they relate to security deposits placed with sellers of the oil fields acquired; these should be ignored for cash flow purposes.
Note: Total cash and bank balances do not include approximately RM 105 m proceeds from the North Sabah December 2019 offtake (which was received in January 2020)
Cash and bank balances of RM 90m do not include RM 105m of proceeds from offtake received in 3Q21 (Jan 2020). Hence, the actual cash and bank balances as of 2Q21 approximate RM 200m.
Liabilities are a little more interesting. First, I’ll draw your attention to the significant Deferred tax liabilities of RM 457m. These largely relate to the amortization of CAPEX (i.e. Equipment and capitalized E&E expenses), which is given an accelerated depreciation treatment for tax purposes.
The way this works is that the government gives Hibiscus a favorable tax treatment on capital expenditures incurred via an accelerated depreciation schedule, so that the taxable income is less than usual. However, this leads to the taxable depreciation being utilized quicker than accounting depreciation, hence the tax payable merely deferred to a later period – when the tax depreciation runs out but accounting depreciation remains. Given the capital intensive nature of the business, it is understandable why Deferred tax liabilities are so large.
We’ve discussed Provision for decommissioning costs under the Finance Costs section earlier. They are also quite significant at RM 266m.
Notably, the Other Payables and Accruals are a hefty RM 431m. What do they relate to? Basically, they are contractual obligations to the sellers of the oil fields which are only payable upon oil prices reaching certain thresholds. Hence, while they are current in nature, they will only become payable when oil prices recover to previous highs, and are hence not an immediate cash outflow concern given today’s low oil prices.
Cash Flow Statement
There is nothing in the cash flow statement which warrants concern.
Notably, the company generated OCF of approximately RM 500m in FY20 and RM 116m in 2Q21. It further incurred RM 330m and RM 234m of CAPEX in FY20 and 2Q21 respectively, largely owing to production enhancement projects to increase the production rate of the Anasuria and North Sabah fields, which according to management estimates are accretive to ROI.
Tax paid was RM 97m in FY20 and RM 61m in 2Q21 (tax expense: RM 161m and RM 62m respectively).

Risks

There are a few obvious and not-so-obvious risks that one should be aware of before investing in Hibiscus. We shall not consider operational risks (e.g. uptime, OPEX) as they are outside the jurisdiction of the equity analyst. Instead, we shall focus on the financial and strategic risks largely outside the control of management. The main ones are:
· Oil prices remaining subdued for long periods of time
· Fluctuation of exchange rates
· Customer concentration risk
· 2P Reserves being less than estimated
· Significant current and non-current liabilities
· Potential issuance of equity
Oil prices remaining subdued
Of topmost concern in the minds of most analysts is whether Hibiscus has the wherewithal to sustain itself through this period of low oil prices (sub-$30). A quick and dirty estimate of annual cash outflow (i.e. burn rate) assuming a $20 oil world and historical production rates is between RM 50m-70m per year, which considering the RM 200m cash balance implies about 3-4 years of sustainability before the company runs out of cash and has to rely on external assistance for financing.
Table 1: Hibiscus EBITDA at different oil price and exchange rates
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The above table shows different EBITDA scenarios (RM ‘m) given different oil prices (left column) and USD:MYR exchange rates (top row). Currently, oil prices are $27 and USD:MYR is 1:4.36.
Given conservative assumptions of average OPEX/bbl of $20 (current: $15), we can safely say that the company will be loss-making as long as oil remains at $20 or below (red). However, we can see that once oil prices hit $25, the company can tank the lower-end estimate of the annual burn rate of RM 50m (orange), while at RM $27 it can sufficiently muddle through the higher-end estimate of the annual burn rate of RM 70m (green).
Hence, we can assume that as long as the average oil price over the next 3-4 years remains above $25, Hibiscus should come out of this fine without the need for any external financing.
Customer Concentration Risk
With regards to customer concentration risk, there is not much the analyst or investor can do except to accept the risk. Fortunately, 80% of revenues can be attributed to two oil supermajors (Petronas and BP), hence the risk of default on contractual obligations and trade receivables seems to be quite diminished.
2P Reserves being less than estimated
2P Reserves being less than estimated is another risk that one should keep in mind. Fortunately, the current market cap is merely RM 714m – at half of estimated recoverable amounts of RM 1.468 billion – so there’s a decent margin of safety. In addition, there are other mitigating factors which shall be discussed in the next section (‘Opportunities’).
Significant non-current and current liabilities
The significant non-current and current liabilities have been addressed in the previous section. It has been determined that they pose no threat to immediate cash flow due to them being long-term in nature (e.g. decommissioning costs, deferred tax, etc). Hence, for the purpose of assessing going concern, their amounts should not be a cause for concern.
Potential issuance of equity
Finally, we come to the possibility of external financing being required in this low oil price environment. While the company should last 3-4 years on existing cash reserves, there is always the risk of other black swan events materializing (e.g. coronavirus) or simply oil prices remaining muted for longer than 4 years.
Furthermore, management has hinted that they wish to acquire new oil assets at presently depressed prices to increase daily production rate to a targeted 20,000 bbl by end-2021. They have room to acquire debt, but they may also wish to issue equity for this purpose. Hence, the possibility of dilution to existing shareholders cannot be entirely ruled out.
However, given management’s historical track record of prioritizing ROI and optimal capital allocation, and in consideration of the fact that the MD owns 10% of outstanding shares, there is some assurance that any potential acquisitions will be accretive to EPS and therefore valuations.

Opportunities

As with the existence of risk, the presence of material opportunities also looms over the company. Some of them are discussed below:
· Increased Daily Oil Production Rate
· Inclusion of 2C Resources
· Future oil prices exceeding $50 and effects from coronavirus dissipating
Increased Daily Oil Production Rate
The first and most obvious opportunity is the potential for increased production rate. We’ve seen in the last quarter (2Q21) that the North Sabah field increased its daily production rate by approximately 20% as a result of production enhancement projects (infill drilling), lowering OPEX/bbl as a result. To vastly oversimplify, infill drilling is the process of maximizing well density by drilling in the spaces between existing wells to improve oil production.
The same improvements are being undertaken at the Anasuria field via infill drilling, subsea debottlenecking, water injection and sidetracking of existing wells. Without boring you with industry jargon, this basically means future production rate is likely to improve going forward.
By how much can the oil production rate be improved by? Management estimates in their analyst presentation that enhancements in the Anasuria field will be able to yield 5,000 bbl/day by 2021 (current: 2,500 bbl/day).
Similarly, improvements in the North Sabah field is expected to yield 7,000 bbl/day by 2021 (current: 5,300 bbl/day).
This implies a total 2021 expected daily production rate from the two fields alone of 12,000 bbl/day (current: 8,000 bbl/day). That’s a 50% increase in yields which we haven’t factored into our valuation yet.
Furthermore, we haven’t considered any production from existing 2C resources (e.g. Marigold/Sunflower) or any potential acquisitions which may occur in the future. By management estimates, this can potentially increase production by another 8,000 bbl/day, bringing total production to 20,000 bbl/day.
While this seems like a stretch of the imagination, it pays to keep them in mind when forecasting future revenues and valuations.
Just to play around with the numbers, I’ve come up with a sensitivity analysis of possible annual EBITDA at different oil prices and daily oil production rates:
Table 2: Hibiscus EBITDA at different oil price and daily oil production rates
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The left column represents different oil prices while the top row represents different daily oil production rates.
The green column represents EBITDA at current daily production rate of 8,000 bbl/day; the orange column represents EBITDA at targeted daily production rate of 12,000 bbl/day; while the purple column represents EBITDA at maximum daily production rate of 20,000 bbl/day.
Even conservatively assuming increased estimated annual ITDA of RM 500m (FY20: RM 318m), and long-term average oil prices of $50 (FY20: $60), the estimated Net Profit and P/E ratio is potentially lucrative at daily oil production rates of 12,000 bbl/day and above.
2C Resources
Since we’re on the topic of improved daily oil production rate, it bears to pay in mind the relatively enormous potential from Hibiscus’s 2C Resources. North Sabah’s 2C Resources alone exceed 30 mmbbl; while those from the yet undiagnosed Marigold/Sunflower fields also reach 30 mmbbl. Altogether, 2C Resources exceed 70 mmbbl, which dwarfs the 44 mmbbl of 2P Reserves we have considered up to this point in our valuation estimates.
To refresh your memory, 2C Resources represents oil volumes which have been discovered but are not yet classified as “commercial”. This means that there is reasonable certainty of the oil being recoverable, as opposed to simply being in the very early stages of exploration. So, to be conservative, we will imagine that only 50% of 2C Resources are eligible for reclassification to 2P reserves, i.e. 35 mmbbl of oil.
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This additional 35 mmbbl of oil represents an 80% increase to existing 2P reserves. Assuming the daily oil production rate increases similarly by 80%, we will arrive at 14,400 bbl/day of oil production. According to Table 2 above, this would yield an EBITDA of roughly RM 630m assuming $50 oil.
Comparing that estimated EBITDA to FY20’s actual EBITDA:
FY20 FY21 (incl. 2C) Difference
Daily oil production (bbl/day) 8,626 14,400 +66%
Average oil price (USD/bbl) $68.57 $50 -27%
Average OPEX/bbl (USD) $16.64 $20 +20%
EBITDA (RM ‘m) 632 630 -
Hence, even conservatively assuming lower oil prices and higher OPEX/bbl (which should decrease in the presence of higher oil volumes) than last year, we get approximately the same EBITDA as FY20.
For the sake of completeness, let’s assume that Hibiscus issues twice the no. of existing shares over the next 10 years, effectively diluting shareholders by 50%. Even without accounting for the possibility of the acquisition of new oil fields, at the current market capitalization of RM 714m, the prospective P/E would be about 10x. Not too shabby.
Future oil prices exceeding $50 and effects from coronavirus dissipating
Hibiscus shares have recently been hit by a one-two punch from oil prices cratering from $60 to $30, as a result of both the Saudi-Russian dispute and depressed demand for oil due to coronavirus. This has massively increased supply and at the same time hugely depressed demand for oil (due to the globally coordinated lockdowns being implemented).
Given a long enough timeframe, I fully expect OPEC+ to come to an agreement and the economic effects from the coronavirus to dissipate, allowing oil prices to rebound. As we equity investors are aware, oil prices are cyclical and are bound to recover over the next 10 years.
When it does, valuations of O&G stocks (including Hibiscus’s) are likely to improve as investors overshoot expectations and begin to forecast higher oil prices into perpetuity, as they always tend to do in good times. When that time arrives, Hibiscus’s valuations are likely to become overoptimistic as all O&G stocks tend to do during oil upcycles, resulting in valuations far exceeding reasonable estimates of future earnings. If you can hold the shares up until then, it’s likely you will make much more on your investment than what we’ve been estimating.

Conclusion

Wrapping up what we’ve discussed so far, we can conclude that Hibiscus’s market capitalization of RM 714m far undershoots reasonable estimates of fair value even under conservative assumptions of recoverable oil volumes and long-term average oil prices. As a value investor, I hesitate to assign a target share price, but it’s safe to say that this stock is worth at least RM 1.00 (current: RM 0.45). Risk is relatively contained and the upside far exceeds the downside. While I have no opinion on the short-term trajectory of oil prices, I can safely recommend this stock as a long-term Buy based on fundamental research.
submitted by investorinvestor to SecurityAnalysis [link] [comments]

Noob Safe Haven Thread | Oct 21-27 2019

Post any options questions you wanted to ask, but were afraid to ask. A weekly thread in which questions will be received with equanimity. There are no stupid questions, only dumb answers.   Fire away. This is a weekly rotation with past threads linked below. This project succeeds thanks to people thoughtfully sharing their knowledge and experiences (YOU are invited to respond to questions posted here.)
Perhaps you're looking for an item in the frequent answers list below.
For a useful response about a particular option trade, disclose position details, so that responders can assist. Vague inquires receive vague responses. Tell us: TICKER -- Put or Call -- strike price (for each leg, on spreads) -- expiration date -- cost of option entry -- date of option entry -- underlying stock price at entry -- current option (spread) market value -- current underlying stock price -- your rationale for entering the position.   .
Key informational links: • Glossary • List of Recommended Books • Introduction to Options (The Options Playbook) • The complete side-bar informational links, for mobile app users.

Links to the most frequent answers

I just made (or lost) $____. Should I close the trade? Yes, close the trade, because you had no plan for an exit to limit your risk. Your trade is a prediction: a plan directs action upon an (in)validated prediction. Take the gain (or loss). End the risk of losing the gain (or increasing the loss). Plan the exit before the start of each trade, for both a gain, and maximum loss. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture)
Why did my options lose value, when the stock price went in a favorable direction? • Options extrinsic and intrinsic value, an introduction (Redtexture)
Getting started in options • Calls and puts, long and short, an introduction (Redtexture) • Exercise & Assignment - A Guide (ScottishTrader) • Some useful educational links • Some introductory trading guidance, with educational links • Options Expiration & Assignment (Option Alpha) • Expiration time and date (Investopedia)
Common mistakes and useful advice for new options traders • Five mistakes to avoid when trading options (Options Playbook) • Top 10 Mistakes Beginner Option Traders Make (Ally Bank) • One year into options trading: lessons learned (whitethunder9) • Here's some cold hard words from a professional trader (magik_moose) • Thoughts after trading for 7 Years (invcht2) • Avoiding Stupidity is Easier than Seeking Brilliance (Farnum Street Blog) • 20 Habits of Highly Successful Traders (Viper Report) (40 minutes) • There's a bull market somewhere (Jason Leavitt) (3 minutes)
Trade planning, risk reduction and trade size, etc. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture) • Trade Checklists and Guides (Option Alpha) • An illustration of planning on trades failing. (John Carter) (at 90 seconds) • Trade Simulator Tool (Radioactive Trading) • Risk of Ruin (Better System Trader)
Minimizing Bid-Ask Spreads (high-volume options are best) • Fishing for a price: price discovery with (wide) bid-ask spreads (Redtexture) • List of option activity by underlying (Market Chameleon) • List of option activity by underlying (Barchart) • Open Interest by ticker (optinistics)
Closing out a trade • Most options positions are closed before expiration (Options Playbook) • When to Exit Guide (Option Alpha) • Risk to reward ratios change over the life of a position: a reason for early exit (Redtexture)
Options Greeks and Option Chains • An Introduction to Options Greeks (Options Playbook) • Options Greeks (Epsilon Options) • Option Greeks (Chris Butler - Project Option) • A selected list of option chain & option data websites • See also the wiki FAQ
Selected Trade Positions & Management • The Wheel Strategy (ScottishTrader) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Options Playbook) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Redtexture) • Long Call vs. Call Spread Options Strategy Comparison (Chris Butler - Project Option) (30 Minutes) • Take the loss (here's why) (Clay Trader) (15 minutes) • The diagonal calendar spread and "poor man's covered call" (Redtexture) • Creative Ways to Avoid The Pattern Day Trader Rule (Sean McLaughlin) • See also the wiki FAQ
Implied Volatility, IV Rank, and IV Percentile (of days) • See the wiki FAQ
Miscellaneous: Economic Calendars, International Brokers, RobinHood, Pattern Day Trader, CBOE Exchange Rules, Contract Specifications, TDA Margin Handbook, EU Regulations on US ETFs, US Taxes and Options • See the wiki FAQ for most of this material • Selected calendars of economic reports and events • An incomplete list of international brokers dealing in US options markets (Redtexture)
Following week's Noob thread: Oct 21-27 2019
Previous weeks' Noob threads:
Oct 14-20 2019 Oct 7-13 2019 Sept 30 - Oct 6 2019
Sept 23-29 2019 Sept 16-22 2019 Sept 09-15 2019 Sept 02-09 2019 Aug 26 - Sept 02 2019
Complete NOOB archive, 2018, and 2019
submitted by redtexture to options [link] [comments]

Noob Safe Haven Thread | Oct 14-20 2019

Post any options questions you wanted to ask, but were afraid to ask. A weekly thread in which questions will be received with equanimity. There are no stupid questions, only dumb answers.   Fire away. This is a weekly rotation with past threads linked below. This project succeeds thanks to people thoughtfully sharing their knowledge and experiences (YOU are invited to respond to questions posted here.)
Perhaps you're looking for an item in the frequent answers list below.
For a useful response about a particular option trade, disclose position details, so that responders can assist. Vague inquires receive vague responses. Tell us: TICKER -- Put or Call -- strike price (for each leg, on spreads) -- expiration date -- cost of option entry -- date of option entry -- underlying stock price at entry -- current option (spread) market value -- current underlying stock price -- your rationale for entering the position.   .
Key informational links: • Glossary • List of Recommended Books • Introduction to Options (The Options Playbook) • The complete side-bar informational links, for mobile app users.

Links to the most frequent answers

I just made (or lost) $____. Should I close the trade? Yes, close the trade, because you had no plan for an exit to limit your risk. Your trade is a prediction: a plan directs action upon an (in)validated prediction. Take the gain (or loss). End the risk of losing the gain (or increasing the loss). Plan the exit before the start of each trade, for both a gain, and maximum loss. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture)
Why did my options lose value, when the stock price went in a favorable direction? • Options extrinsic and intrinsic value, an introduction (Redtexture)
Getting started in options • Calls and puts, long and short, an introduction (Redtexture) • Exercise & Assignment - A Guide (ScottishTrader) • Some useful educational links • Some introductory trading guidance, with educational links • Options Expiration & Assignment (Option Alpha) • Expiration time and date (Investopedia)
Common mistakes and useful advice for new options traders • Five mistakes to avoid when trading options (Options Playbook) • Top 10 Mistakes Beginner Option Traders Make (Ally Bank) • One year into options trading: lessons learned (whitethunder9) • Here's some cold hard words from a professional trader (magik_moose) • Thoughts after trading for 7 Years (invcht2) • Avoiding Stupidity is Easier than Seeking Brilliance (Farnum Street Blog) • 20 Habits of Highly Successful Traders (Viper Report) (40 minutes) • There's a bull market somewhere (Jason Leavitt) (3 minutes)
Trade planning, risk reduction and trade size, etc. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture) • Trade Checklists and Guides (Option Alpha) • An illustration of planning on trades failing. (John Carter) (at 90 seconds) • Trade Simulator Tool (Radioactive Trading) • Risk of Ruin (Better System Trader)
Minimizing Bid-Ask Spreads (high-volume options are best) • Fishing for a price: price discovery with (wide) bid-ask spreads (Redtexture) • List of option activity by underlying (Market Chameleon) • List of option activity by underlying (Barchart) • Open Interest by ticker (optinistics)
Closing out a trade • Most options positions are closed before expiration (Options Playbook) • When to Exit Guide (Option Alpha) • Risk to reward ratios change over the life of a position: a reason for early exit (Redtexture)
Options Greeks and Option Chains • An Introduction to Options Greeks (Options Playbook) • Options Greeks (Epsilon Options) • Theta Decay: The Ultimate Guide (Chris Butler - Project Option) • Theta decay rates differ: At the money vs. away from the money • Theta: A Detailed Look at the Decay of Option Time Value (James Toll) • Gamma Risk Explained - (Gavin McMaster - Options Trading IQ) • How Often Within Expected Move? Data Science and Implied Volatility (Michael Rechenthin, PhD - TastyTrade 2017) • A selected list of option chain & option data websites
Selected Trade Positions & Management • The Wheel Strategy (ScottishTrader) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Options Playbook) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Redtexture) • Synthetic option positions: Why and how they are used (Fidelity) • Covered Calls Tutorial (Option Investor) • Covered Calls - Chris Butler - Project Option (20 minutes) • The 10 Most Common Mistakes Made by Covered Call Writers - Allen Ellman - Blue Caller Investor (8 minutes) • Take the loss (here's why) (Clay Trader) (15 minutes) • The diagonal calendar spread and "poor man's covered call" (Redtexture) • Creative Ways to Avoid The Pattern Day Trader Rule (Sean McLaughlin) • Short calls and puts, and dividend risk (Redtexture) • Options and Dividend Risk (Sage Anderson, TastyTrade) • Options contract adjustments: what you should know (Fidelity) • Options contract adjustment announcements / memoranda (Options Clearing Corporation)
Implied Volatility, IV Rank, and IV Percentile (of days) • An introduction to Implied Volatility (Khan Academy) • An introduction to Black Scholes formula (Khan Academy) • IV Rank vs. IV Percentile: Which is better? (Project Option) • IV Rank vs. IV Percentile in Trading (Tasty Trade) (video)
Miscellaneous: Economic Calendars, International Brokers, RobinHood, Pattern Day Trader, CBOE Exchange Rules, Contract Specifications, TDA Margin Handbook, EU Regulations on US ETFs, US Taxes and Options • Selected calendars of economic reports and events • An incomplete list of international brokers dealing in US options markets (Redtexture) • Free brokerages can be very costly: Why option traders should not use RobinHood • Pattern Day Trader status and $25,000 margin account balances (FINRA) • How to find out when a new expiration is opening up: email: [email protected] for the status of a particular ticker's new expirations.
• CBOE Contract Specifications and Trading Days & Hours • TDAmeritrade Margin Handbook (18 pages PDF) • Monthly expirations of Index options are settled on next day prices • PRIIPS, KIPs, EU regulations, ETFs, Options, Brokers • Key Information Documents (KIDs) for European Citizens (Options Clearing Corporation) • Taxes and Investing (Options Industry Council) (PDF) • CBOE Exchange Rules (770+ pages, PDF) • NASDAQ Options Exchange Rules
Following week's Noob thread: Oct 21-27 2019
Previous weeks' Noob threads:
Oct 7-13 2019 Sept 30 - Oct 6 2019
Sept 23-29 2019 Sept 16-22 2019 Sept 09-15 2019 Sept 02-09 2019 Aug 26 - Sept 02 2019
Complete NOOB archive, 2018, and 2019
submitted by redtexture to options [link] [comments]

Noob Safe Haven Thread | Oct 7-13 2019

Post any options questions you wanted to ask, but were afraid to ask. A weekly thread in which questions will be received with equanimity. There are no stupid questions, only dumb answers.   Fire away. This is a weekly rotation with past threads linked below. This project succeeds thanks to people thoughtfully sharing their knowledge and experiences (YOU are invited to respond to questions posted here.)
Perhaps you're looking for an item in the frequent answers list below.
For a useful response about a particular option trade, disclose position details, so that responders can assist. Vague inquires receive vague responses. Tell us: TICKER -- Put or Call -- strike price (for each leg, on spreads) -- expiration date -- cost of option entry -- date of option entry -- underlying stock price at entry -- current option (spread) market value -- current underlying stock price -- your rationale for entering the position.   .
Key informational links: • Glossary • List of Recommended Books • Introduction to Options (The Options Playbook) • The complete side-bar informational links, for mobile app users.

Links to the most frequent answers

I just made (or lost) $____. Should I close the trade? Yes, close the trade, because you had no plan for an exit to limit your risk. Your trade is a prediction: a plan directs action upon an (in)validated prediction. Take the gain (or loss). End the risk of losing the gain (or increasing the loss). Plan the exit before the start of each trade, for both a gain, and maximum loss. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture)
Why did my options lose value, when the stock price went in a favorable direction? • Options extrinsic and intrinsic value, an introduction (Redtexture)
Getting started in options • Calls and puts, long and short, an introduction (Redtexture) • Exercise & Assignment - A Guide (ScottishTrader) • Some useful educational links • Some introductory trading guidance, with educational links • Options Expiration & Assignment (Option Alpha) • Expiration time and date (Investopedia)
Common mistakes and useful advice for new options traders • Five mistakes to avoid when trading options (Options Playbook) • Top 10 Mistakes Beginner Option Traders Make (Ally Bank) • One year into options trading: lessons learned (whitethunder9) • Here's some cold hard words from a professional trader (magik_moose) • Thoughts after trading for 7 Years (invcht2) • Avoiding Stupidity is Easier than Seeking Brilliance (Farnum Street Blog) • 20 Habits of Highly Successful Traders (Viper Report) (40 minutes) • There's a bull market somewhere (Jason Leavitt) (3 minutes)
Trade planning, risk reduction and trade size, etc. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture) • Trade Checklists and Guides (Option Alpha) • An illustration of planning on trades failing. (John Carter) (at 90 seconds) • Trade Simulator Tool (Radioactive Trading) • Risk of Ruin (Better System Trader)
Minimizing Bid-Ask Spreads (high-volume options are best) • Fishing for a price: price discovery with (wide) bid-ask spreads (Redtexture) • List of option activity by underlying (Market Chameleon) • List of option activity by underlying (Barchart) • Open Interest by ticker (optinistics)
Closing out a trade • Most options positions are closed before expiration (Options Playbook) • When to Exit Guide (Option Alpha) • Risk to reward ratios change over the life of a position: a reason for early exit (Redtexture)
Options Greeks and Option Chains • An Introduction to Options Greeks (Options Playbook) • Options Greeks (Epsilon Options) • Theta Decay: The Ultimate Guide (Chris Butler - Project Option) • Theta decay rates differ: At the money vs. away from the money • Theta: A Detailed Look at the Decay of Option Time Value (James Toll) • Gamma Risk Explained - (Gavin McMaster - Options Trading IQ) • How Often Within Expected Move? Data Science and Implied Volatility (Michael Rechenthin, PhD - TastyTrade 2017) • A selected list of option chain & option data websites
Selected Trade Positions & Management • The Wheel Strategy (ScottishTrader) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Options Playbook) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Redtexture) • Synthetic option positions: Why and how they are used (Fidelity) • Covered Calls Tutorial (Option Investor) • Take the loss (here's why) (Clay Trader) (15 minutes) • The diagonal calendar spread and "poor man's covered call" (Redtexture) • Creative Ways to Avoid The Pattern Day Trader Rule (Sean McLaughlin) • Short calls and puts, and dividend risk (Redtexture) • Options and Dividend Risk (Sage Anderson, TastyTrade) • Options contract adjustments: what you should know (Fidelity) • Options contract adjustment announcements / memoranda (Options Clearing Corporation)
Implied Volatility, IV Rank, and IV Percentile (of days) • An introduction to Implied Volatility (Khan Academy) • An introduction to Black Scholes formula (Khan Academy) • IV Rank vs. IV Percentile: Which is better? (Project Option) • IV Rank vs. IV Percentile in Trading (Tasty Trade) (video)
Miscellaneous: Economic Calendars, International Brokers, RobinHood, Pattern Day Trader, CBOE Exchange Rules, Contract Specifications, TDA Margin Handbook, EU Regulations on US ETFs, US Taxes and Options • Selected calendars of economic reports and events • An incomplete list of international brokers dealing in US options markets (Redtexture) • Free brokerages can be very costly: Why option traders should not use RobinHood • Pattern Day Trader status and $25,000 margin account balances (FINRA) • How to find out when a new expiration is opening up: email: [email protected] for the status of a particular ticker's new expirations.
• CBOE Contract Specications and Trading Days & Hours • TDAmeritrade Margin Handbook (18 pages PDF) • Monthly expirations of Index options are settled on next day prices • PRIIPS, KIPs, EU regulations, ETFs, Options, Brokers • Key Information Documents (KIDs) for European Citizens (Options Clearing Corporation) • Taxes and Investing (Options Industry Council) (PDF) • CBOE Exchange Rules (770+ pages, PDF) • NASDAQ Options Exchange Rules
Following week's Noob thread: Oct 14-20 2019
Previous weeks' Noob threads:
Sept 30 - Oct 6 2019 Sept 23-29 2019 Sept 16-22 2019 Sept 09-15 2019 Sept 02-09 2019 Aug 26 - Sept 02 2019
Complete NOOB archive, 2018, and 2019
submitted by redtexture to options [link] [comments]

A Short Story that Describes Imaginary Events and People of Worldwide Calamities and the Aftermath (the 2nd Edition)

The following story, all names, characters, and incidents portrayed in this post are fictitious. No identification with actual persons (living or deceased), places, buildings, and products is intended or should be inferred.
However, the LINKS to real-life events and inspiring sources are placed here and there throughout the story.
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Truth is the Only Light
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INTRO
☞ [As of 2019] there are plenty of reasons to think the Chinese system will implode spectacularly without Japanese feeling the need to do a thing. — Peter Zaihan, Disunited Nations (Mar 03, 2020)
It's apparent that two nations have been engaged in a high-stakes military & economy arms race. The current US admin has been hitting China with waves of tariffs, but that was merely a small part of what's actually going on. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
On Oct 11, 2019, when they reached a tentative agreement for the first phase of a trade deal, the fact that China made the concession actually made my jaw drop. From where I sit, it was a worrisome scene. Aren't people saying, when challenging situations are bottled up, they will just grow and mutate into another terrible complications?
Admittedly I was not certain how they are going to adhere to the agreement: It left most of the US tariffs (on China's exports) in place, and at the same time, came with an additional USD $200 Billion burden for China over the next two years. This agreement might seem a bit insignificant, but now China would need to purchase almost twice the size of the US products & services they did before the trade war began.
With their current economic climate? I murmured, "No way."
While watching Trump brag and boast around with said agreement, I expected China would soon come out and fling some improvised excuses in order to delay the document-signing process. It wouldn't be their first time. More importantly, even if China does so, there wouldn't be many (real) counterattack options left for the Trump admin during this year, the US presidential election year.
Then, on Jan 16, 2020, the world’s two largest economies actually signed a partial trade agreement aimed at putting the brakes on an 18-month trade war. China would almost surely not sit down but come back to bite, I thought.
Enter the worldwide chaos following so called the COVID-19 outbreak.
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BACKGROUND
☞ Globalists have been heavily investing in China's economy and its components overseas.
• Here are a couple of well known names: the Great Old One; George Soros; Koos Bekker; and Bill Gates.
• For the sake of convenience, from here on, let's call these globalists, who are foreign investors in China's top tier state-owned/sponsored/controlled enterprises, Team-Z.
• Team-Z has adopted big time lackeys like Henry Kissinger or small time ones like Larry Summers, Stephen Hadley, or Bill Browder as matchmakers to court Team-Z for China's top tier enterprises. When Israel's highest echelons chimed in, it has been through Israeli IT companies and the BRI projects.
• Naturally, multinational investment banks have also been employed; such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), UBS Group AG (formerly Union Bank of Switzerland), Blackstone Group, Canaccord Genuity, BlackRock, Hermitage, or Mirae Asset.
☞ Note: The Great Old One didn't use any matchmakers, something peasants would need. Because the Great Old One's power level is over 9000.
• China's Shanghai clique used to keep the nation's state-sponsored enterprises under their firm grip: Enterprises such as Alibaba Group, Tencent, Baidu, Wanda Group, HNA Group, Anbang Group, Evergrande Group, CEFC Energy and Huawei, all of which Team-Z has massively invested in.
Here is how Shanghai clique and Team-Z, esp. Bill Gates, started to get together: [LINK]
• However, in the name of anti-corruption campaign, Xi Jinping & his Princelings have been taking those businesses away from Shanghai clique's hand, and transforming those state-sponsored private enterprises into the state-owned enterprises, declaring the 國進民退 movement.
• Slaying Shanghai clique's control = [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
• 國進民退 + Slaying Shanghai clique's control = [A] [B] [C]
• Xi's reign didn't arrive today without challenges though: the BRI projects' poor outcome has frustrated Israel's great expectations. And since the US-China trade war has started, the problems of China's economic systems started to surface, not to mention China's economy has long been decaying.
• Coupled with the US-China trade war, the current US admin has been trying to block Huawei from accessing the international financial systems that the US can influence, as well as the US banking systems. This is a good time to remind you again that Bill Gates has had a very close-knit relationship with Huawei.
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TRADE WAR & INTERNET-BASED COMPANIES
☞ It's the trade war, but why were internet-based companies such as Tencent and Baidu suffering losses?
Answer: The state-sponsored companies like Tencent, Baidu, or Huawei have heavily invested in international trade and commodity markets, which are easily influenced by aspects that IMF interest rates, the US sanctions, or trade war can create.
Example: Let's say, Tencent invests in a Tehran-based ride-hailing company. Then, through said ride-hailing company, Tencent invests in Iran's petroleum industry. Now, China's most valuable IT company is in international petrochemical trade. The business is going to make great strides until the US imposes trade embargoes oand economic sanctions against Iran.
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TL;DR
China's economy going down = Team-Z losing an astronomical amount of money.
★ Wednesday, Sep 26, 2018 ★
"Gentlemen, you guys might want to do something before it's too bloody late, no? His speech last night was .... (sniggers) Mr. Gates, now is as good a time as any. Mr. Soros, hm, don't look at me like that."
".... But,"
"Yes, Mr. Soros, your HNA is going down, too. .... Ah, Schwarzman xiansheng, we're very sorry to learn about Blackstone's Iran & SinopecChina situation. So, we're guessing, you'd be happy to join Mr. Gates's operation, yes? Of course, We already contacted Kissinger xiansheng. .... Okay then, Gentlemen?"
• Now you can take a guess why George Soros has recently been sending out confusing messages regarding Xi Jinping.
• Wait, how about Wuhan Institute of Virology? Doesn't this story concern the COVID-19 outbreak? Is the Wuhan Institute also associated with Shanghai clique? Yes, indeed. Here's How Wuhan Institute of Virology and Shanghai Clique are related: [LINK]
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EIGHT OBJECTIVES
☞ Calling for the tide to be turned, Team-Z and Shanghai clique started to devise the plan. The objectives are:
By shutting down international trade, crashing world economy, and exploiting its aftermath, the plan should produce an outcome letting Team-Z earn back their loss from the trade war & the US sanctions, and collect additional profits from China's BRI projects & stock markets worldwide, including the US stock markets.
Don't forget this: This point number also concerns the developing nations on the BRI with the large deposits of natural resources that Team-Z has invested in through China. If everything comes together nicely, Team-Z will pick up trillions of dollars from those nations alone as if they are light as a feather. Ironically this will reinforce the BRI project governance and mitigate fraud & corruption risks inherent to the international development projects.
By utilizing the aftermath in the US, a new US administration consisted of pro-Beijing personnels should be fostered at the 2020 election. In a worst-case scenario, the aftermath should be abused enough to make Robert Lighthizer to leave the admin. Mr. Mnuchin could stay.
Sometime next year, the phase one trade deal must be reassessed with the new US admin. The reassessment should help China take the upper-hand at the second phase trade talk.
The pandemic crisis should yield a situation which allows China to delay the payments for its state-firm offshore debts. With the point number , this will give China a breathing room to manage its steadily-fallen forex reserves.
Since their current turf (in China) is education industry & medical science industry, Shanghai clique will have no issue with earning hefty profits by managing China's export of medical equipments & health care products which can be supplied worldwide mainly by China. People in the west will bent the knees for the clique's support.
☞ Regarding Jiang Zemin's son and medical science industry in China [LINK]
The outcome should weaken Xi & his Princelings' political power considerably in favour of Shanghai clique & Team-Z. This will let Jiang's Shanghai clique (A) reclaim some of political status & business interest controls they have lost to Xi & his Princelings.
• And once this point number , with the point number , is realized, it would be much easier for the clique to (B) recover their huge assets hidden overseas that the current US admin or Xi & his Princelings have frozen.
Combining good old bribery with sex, the outcome should support China to re-secure control over the US governors. Once the plan is executed successfully, those governors would desperately need solutions to local economic problems and unemployment.
Lastly, implementing an e-ID system in the US similar to Beijing's Alipay and WeChat could be the cherry on top of the operation's entire outcomes. Who's supporting such a system worldwide? None other than Microsoft and Rockefeller Foundation. ಠ_ಠ
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OLD COMRADE BECOMES A NEW RECRUIT
☞ They were afraid more talents were needed. The main target was the world’s largest economy with the most powerful military capability, after all.
They ended up asking Mr. Fridman to see Lord Putin about that. The old Vova was going through a lot nowadays, people said. It could be because his nation's energy business to Europe seems to be hitting wall after wall. He is said to have enough on his plate with no end in sight, so maybe he'll join.
★ Monday, Jan 15, 2018 ★
"(pours a drink for himself) I know, but. ... What would happen if Bashar falls? How long you think you can keep it up? .... Erdogan is many things (sniggers) but he's never gentle. (sips his drink slowly) When Benji's EastMed Pipeline starts to actively compete, then what? They got the China money now. .... Vagit and his buddies will be very unhappy. You know that. Not great, Vova."
"...."
"Ah, you mean what are we going to do? Hm? Hm. I'll tell you what we're going to do. This time, we're going to bankrupt the US shale gas sector. Then, of course, we can maybe convince Benji to take their time with the pipeline. Perhaps for good. (sips his drink slowly) Don't worry, Vova, It'll work. You worry too much. We'll come out the other side stronger."
"So, how long until they set it off?
"Hahaa, yes. They'll soon put all things in place. While marching in place, they'll play the tune a couple of months before the next sochelnik."
"Nearly 20 months to brace things here, then?"
"(nod slowly in happiness) Hm. Оторви́сь там, оттопы́рься, Vova"
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USEFUL IDIOTS
☞ When the directive came, these idiots answered claiming they would be gladly "on it." All in the name of rejuvenating China's economy without grasping the real objective prevailing throughout the entire operation. Thing is, they would never realize what they are to Team-Z & their Asian overlord until it’s too late.
Who are they? It's A and B, not A or B: (A) the American corporations that are too big to fail and have suffered a considerable loss because of the US-China trade war. Among those corporations, (B) the ones that have been structured with massive interest-profit relationships in/with China.
"We need China in order for the US as a nation to continue being prosper," they've been shouting. No surprise there, because they've enjoyed the strides of extraordinary profits over the years while the US middle class has continued to shrink.
But, in 2019 when China's stock markets nosedived for the first time since 2015 and China's authorities in financial stability & resiliency fumbled their response; it wiped that smile off their face. Still, they'll keep behaving not to offend their Asian overlord, nonetheless.
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PERFECT PLAN
☞ Many crucial components had to come into play all at once in order to cause World War I. If one of the components were missing or different, it is unlikely that the World War I as we know of could be produced.
The US in 2019: Overbought bubbles + Over borrowed corporations
The US in 2020: It's an Election Year.
Russia has been dumping US Treasuries for the past few years.
Russia has been hoarding golds as if they were recreating Inca Empire.
China in 2019: Immense & long term financial troubles has started to surface.
China in 2020: The phase-one deal has been signed; leaving most of tariffs on China intact and adding another $200 Billion burden for China.
Team-Z sets up a situation in the US where some event(s) would freeze the US supply chains & demand for the next three to ten months.
• Just like the 9/11, the event will be initiated at the clique's own region. However, unlike in China, the US will report multiple epicentres simultaneously.
• And the CDC and the US medical task force will carry on with a number of sabotage acts, to secure enough time for the infected yet untested in those US epicentres to spread plenty. [1] [2] [3]
• Here's a feasible timeline of the operation.
Then, the BOOM: Team-Z (a) manipulates the markets to make sure MM will have liquidity concerns (b) when they need it most. The (c) bottomed out oil price will be an enforcement, which will also wreck the US energy sector as a kicker. The (d) WHO will also join as a disinformation campaign office.
• Then a couple of big name investment managers will lead a movement that (will try to) bring back foreign money back to China. [1] [2]
• Meanwhile, in US, the disinformation campaign will continue to be pushed until the second wave of attack arrives.
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MEASURABLE SHORT-TERM OUTCOME
☞ We're now going through World War III. The global structure laid down by World War II had been shaken by globalization and the rise of China. This pandemic event will shock the structure further. Human history will be divided into Before 2021 and After 2021.
① Outcome pt. 1: Immediate Aftermath [pt.1] [pt.2]
② Outcome pt. 2: The US economy goes deep dive along with world economy, and the only thing Team-Z has to do is to exploit the aftermath which has been thoroughly calculated and eagerly anticipated. — Favoured assessment: There won't be a V curve ever, unless drastic measures taken within the timeframe of four months. Unprecedented market crash, the rapid unemployment acceleration because of the supply-chain shut down, and the near-death security which in turn forces consumer confidence to plummet. We're looking at a super long L shape curve unless the US prepares fast for the second wave of their asymmetric warfare.
③ Outcome pt. 3: Arguably the most important outcome. — Because of the unprecedented shutdown of international trade, the nations heavily rely on exporting natural resources will face the extreme financial threats. What if some of those are emerging markets AND massively in debt to China? What do you think China would do to said nations while the aftermath is hitting the globe hard? [PDF] Something comparable to Latin American Debt Crisis will happen.
④ Outcome pt. 4: Not that significant compared to the others but still notable outcome. — The world will need Shanghai clique's help to get medical products and equipments.
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WHAT'S NEXT?
☞ Several analysts have discussed off the record that next it'd be a proxy warfare not using armed conflicts but with spreading a galaxy of counterfeit-currency across every possible channels.
Coincidently, on Dec 13, 2017, Business Insider reported in an article "A $100 counterfeit 'supernote' found in South Korea could have been made in North Korea" that:
"It was the first of a new kind of supernote ever found in the world," Lee Ho-Joong, head of KEB Hana Bank's anti-counterfeit centre told Agence France-Presse.
Reporting the same news, The Telegraph published an article on Dec 11, 2017:
"It seems that whoever printed these supernotes has the facilities and high level of technology matching that of a government", said Lee Ho-jung, a bank spokesman from KEB Hana Bank in South Korea. "They are made with special ink that changes colour depending on the angle, patterned paper and Intaglio printing that gives texture to the surface of a note".
ಠ_ಠ
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Tale of How Shanghai clique and Globalists Got Together
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Wuhan City, & Shanghai Clique
Feasible Timeline of the COVID-19 Operation
Immediate Aftermath — pt.1.b
Immediate Aftermath — pt.2.a
Remdesivir, Gilead Sciences, Its Shareholders, & Silly Concern
Cases Displaying the Recent Climate of Chinese Economy
Compliance Report by the US State Department on China regarding Biological Weapons Convention — Click "2019 August Unclassified Compliance Report" and see p45.
Jiang Zemin's son & Medical Science Industry in China
What is Guanxi (關係)?
Israeli IT Companies & China
Opinion article "Cancel All Debt to China"
Fun Trivia about Bush Family and China
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